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Applying Penalty Enhancements to Civil
Disobedience: Clarifying the Free Speech Clause
Model to Bring the Social Value of Political Protest
into the Balance
LESLE GIELoW JACOBS*
Many federal and state statutes contain penalty enhancement sections that
are targeted at eliminating specific conduct, but that have the additional impact
of affecting free speech when applied to civilly disobedient lawbreaking.
Professor Jacobs criticizes the current free speech clause model, which does
not distinguish between expressive and nonexpressive lawbreaking. Professor
Jacobs then suggests clanfications to the current free speech clause model,
which bring the social value of civilly disobedient lawbreaking into the
constitutional balance. She concludes that the constitutionality of penalty
enhancements, as applied to acts of civil disobedience, should depend upon a
particularized balance that weighs the government's interest in uniform penalty
enhancement against the lawbreaking's expressive value.
I. INTRODUCTION
Breaking the law can be a powerful means of expression-its emotive
appeal' and breadth of impact2 are far greater than if the message were
* Associate Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific. B.A.
1982, Wesleyan University; J.D. 1985, University of Michigan. Thanks to Alan Brownstein,
Joshua Dressier, and John Sims for providing helpful criticism on earlier drafts of this
Article, and to Paul Fuller for his help in computerizing the diagrams.
I See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (stating in the context of word
choice that "[w]e cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the
cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which,
practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall message sought
to be communicated").
2 See, e.g., University of Utah Students Against Apartheid v. Peterson, 649 F. Supp.
1200, 1205 n.9 (D. Utah 1986) ("While the mass media often pays little attention to
unorthodox or unpopular ideas, dramatic displays of action capture media attention when
words alone will not."); Dan Harrie, S.L. Councilwoman Leads Protest of JEDI Women at
Capitol, SALT LAKE TRm., Feb. 15, 1996, at A9 (quoting councilwoman who participated in
House gallery protest to say, "Sometimes you have to do this kind of thing to get their
attention, and we got their attention"); Dan Levy, A Decade of AIDS Activism Chaged
America-And ACT-UP, S.F. CHRoN., Mar. 22, 1997, at Al ("Angered by widespread
indifference and prejudice against people with AIDS, the activist group [ACT-UP] used high-
impact media tactics to radically alter the way government and the pharmaceutical industry
responded to the epidemic."); Marilyn Martinez, Learning the Ropes of Civil Disobedience,
L.A. TIms, Dec. 7, 1996, at B1 (citing an environmental activist for the observation that
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delivered by lawful means.3 Still, the free speech clause of the First
Amendment holds no sanctuary for violators. 4 So long as a law is directed at
eliminating harmful conduct rather than suppressing disfavored ideas,5 the
government may punish6 or hold civilly responsible, 7 those who break it.8 The
fact that a particular criminal's purpose in breaking the law was to publicize an
"[p]articipation by celebrities [in the protests] seems to have helped by landing issues on the
evening news").
3 See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of
Categorization and Bakmcing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 -ARv. L. REv. 1482,
1489-90 (1975) ("[Much] of the effectiveness of [draft card burner] O'Brien's
communication... derived precisely from the fact that it was illegal. Had there been no law
prohibiting draft card burning .... he might have attracted no more attention than he would
have by swallowing a goldfish.").
4 See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 918 (1982) ("While the
State legitimately may impose damages for the consequences of violent conduct, it may not
award compensation for the consequences of nonviolent, protected activity. Only those losses
proximately caused by unlawful conduct may be recovered."); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S.
39, 48 (1966) (rejecting the assumption, in the context of a peaceful trespass protest at the
county jail, "that people who want to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional
right to do so whenever and however and wherever they please"); Northeast Women's Ctr.,
Inc. v. MeMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1349 (3d Cir. 1989) (instructing the jury that "[t]he same
constitution that protects the defendants' right to free speech, also protects the Center's right
to abortion services and the patients' rights to receive those services").
5 See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993) (distinguishing statutes "aimed at
conduct unprotected by the First Amendment" from government actions "explicitly directed
at expression" for purposes of constitutional analysis); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 377 (1968) (establishing a four-part test for examining government actions ostensibly
directed at conduct but which incidentally impact expression, the application of which hinges
on determining that "the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression"); see also infra notes 57-69 and Diagram A.
6 Civil disobedient protestors may be subject to state criminal prosecution, such as for
disorderly conduct, trespass, or some more specific property crime, or federal criminal
prosecution, when their protest activities fall within the definition of federal crimes. See Bruce
Ledewitz, Perspectives on the Law of the American Sit-in, 16 WhTrIE L. REv. 499, 533-69
(1995) (listing the forms of state and federal liability for nonviolent sit-ins).
7 Protest activities may lead to state tort liability, which may include liability for
punitive damages, see, e.g., Operation Rescue-National v. Planned Parenthood of
Houston & Southeast Tex., Inc., 937 S.W.2d 60 (1996) (awarding actual and punitive
damages based upon a jury finding of liability for civil conspiracy, tortuous interference,
and invasion of privacy and property rights) or civil liability under state or federal
statutes, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1984) (providing for civil liability); 8 U.S.C.
§ 248 (1970) (same).
SSee discussion infra Part l.B (detailing how the government usually wins under the
lenient O'Brien standard).
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injustice is no defense to the prosecution.9 Rather, accepting the penalty is part
of the dissident's speech.' 0 "Is your law's moral grounding just in light of the
sacrifice that I am willing to endure in order to register my opposition to it?"
the convicted protesters dramatically ask the majority as they are led off to
jail."
Thus, the Constitution does not protect civil disobedients from imposition
of punishment for their crimes.12 Such a constitutional principle would subvert
the rule of law upon which this constitutional democracy is based.13 But what
of enhanced punishment for the illegal act based upon the perpetrator's motive
or means? Does it follow that augmenting punishments in particular instances
9 See, e.g., National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 616 (7th Cir. 1992)
("Although the defendants' acts generated publicity which they may have hoped would
influence governmental actors, this tangential contact is not sufficient to invoke First
Amendment protection for otherwise criminal behavior." (citing NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1981))); see also United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193
(9th Cir. 1991) (articulating a four-pronged test for invocation of the necessity defense and
reasoning that violators who engage in indirect civil disobedience cases, breaking a law that is
not the direct object of protest, will never qualify). But see Kenneth R. Bazinet, UPI, Apr.
16, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (reporting the acquittal of Amy Carter
and Abbie Hoffman of trespass and disorderly conduct during a protest of illegal CIA
activities based upon the necessity defense).
10 See, e.g., United States v. Dorell, 758 F.2d 427, 432 (9th Cir. 1985) (imposing
punishment on a civil disobedient, noting "the validation of [the protest's] sincerity that lawful
punishment provides"); Steven M. Bauer & Peter J. Eckerstrom, Note, The State Made Me
Do It. The Applicability of the Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience, 39 STAN. L. REv.
1173, 1184-89 (1987) (summarizing the reasons that have been advanced as to why
willingness to accept punishment is a necessary element of civil disobedience); Editorial,
PRESS-EmMrPsE (Riverside, Cal.), Dec. 5, 1996, at A10 (commenting upon recent student
protests at University of California, Riverside, and noting "[tihe fundamental rule... that
those who do the crime of conscience are prepared to do the time").
11 See, e.g., JoHN RAwLs, A THEORYOFJUSICE 366 (1971). Rawls states that:
By engaging in civil disobedience a minority forces the majority to consider whether it
wishes to have its actions construed in this way [as a persistent and deliberate violation of
the public conception of justice], or whether, in view of the common sense of justice, it
wishes to acknowledge the legitimate claims of the minority.
Id.
12 See, e.g., Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 148 (1967) (noting that freedom
of speech does not include freedom to trespass).
13 See, e.g., Dorrell, 758 F.2d at 435 (Ferguson, J., concurring) ("Regardless of the
means chosen, those who practice civil disobedience do not challenge the rule of law or the
incidents of an ordered society."); United States v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336, 339 (D. Md.
1968) ("No civilized nation can endure where a citizen can select what law he would obey
because of his moral or religious belief.").
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that may include civil disobedience poses no greater constitutional problem than
does imposing the base penalty for the unlawful action?
According to current constitutional doctrine, 14 various types of penalty
enhancements-whether through victim-targeting or means-targeting statutory
provisions or general state law punitive damages rules-are presumptively
constitutional because their underlying trigger is unlawful conduct unprotected
by the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. 15 As the reasoning goes,
simply enhancing a legitimate punishment does not pose any additional
constitutional problem so long as the overall enhancement is not aimed at
suppressing a particular point of view.16
Consider the following examples, however:
1. A group of state university students decide to protest the almost all-white
faculty composition, which they believe to be the result of hiring decisions in
violation of state and federal statutory and constitutional anti-discrimination
guarantees. As a means of protest, they choose a white professor whom they
believe to epitomize the faculty's racial composition and quietly walk into his
office and sit. 17 When asked to leave, they refuse. They are arrested for
14 See discussion infra Part ll.B (explaining and diagramming the current free speech
clause model).
15 See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1992) (citing the fact that the
penalty enhancement statute at issue aimed at unprotected conduct as one reason for its
validity); see also discussion infra Part II.B (explaining how Mitchell's analysis of the hate
crime penalty enhancement provision at issue provides a framework that establishes the
presumptive constitutionality of other types of penalty enhancements).
16 See Mitchell, 508 U.S. 485, 488 (acknowledging that "the only reason for the
enhancement is the defendant's discriminatory motive for selecting his victim," but
distinguishing the statute's legitimate motive target from illegitimate punishment based upon
"mere disagreement with offenders' beliefs or biases").
17 Building occupation is a common means of student protest. See, e.g., Ann hmse, fiff
Chapel No Sanctuay for Students, ROCKY MouNTAIN NEws, May 31, 1997, at 4A (noting
that divinity school students occupy chapel to protest tenure denial and racism); Edmund Lee,
Race and Class: Inside the Columbia Student Movement, VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 23, 1996, at
12 ("Some 100 students are slumped around the marble-and-oak lobby of Columbia
University's main college building, which they have occupied and blockaded for three days,
the culmination of a school year's worth of agitation and protest for an ethnic studies
department."); Amy Wallace & Diana Marcum, Prop. 209 Foes Seize Building at UC
Riverside, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1996, at A3 (stating that students occupy building to protest
implementation of anti-affirmative action initiative).
Choosing the place of protest for its symbolic significance is almost always a part of
trespass protest. See, e.g., Jerry Miller, Anti-Nuclear Rally Planned at Seabrook, Acts of
Civil Disobedience May Draw Arrests Saturday, UNION LEADER, Apr. 24, 1997, at A4
(quoting an anti-nuclear group member, who said of their planned protest at a nuclear plant
that "[a]cts of civil disobedience are symbolic acts.... Obviously we won't be able to shut
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trespass, which bears a maximum penalty of three months' imprisonment or a
$500 fine under state law. However, because they "[i]ntentionally select[ed]
the... property... affected by the crime... because of the race [of
the]... occupant of that property," their ordinary misdemeanor penalty is
"revised" to a maximum fine of $10,000 or a maximum one year of
imprisonment.18
2. Members of a nationwide anti-abortion women's organization decide to
protest the injustice of a Constitution that permits abortion.19 As a means of
protest, they gather in large groups, kneel, and pray in front of abortion clinic
entrances.20 They purposely trespass on clinic property for their prayer in order
to advertise the conflict between earthly and heavenly law.21 Moreover, they
notify the media in advance of their planned protest targets in order to
maximize the publicity for their message. 22 Every time the group holds a
prayer vigil, the clinics are forced to shut down, at least for the hours required
the plant down").
18 WIS. STAT. § 939.645 (1996), which was upheld in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S.
476(1992).
19 This hypothetical combines facts from a number of reports of abortion protests.
20 See, e.g., Woodall v. Reno, 47 F.3d 656, 657 (4th Cir. 1995) ("Plaintiff Concerned
Women for America (CWA) alleges that it is 'the nation's largest pro-family women's
organization, with... 600,000 members.' CWA says that some of its members pray
peacefully 'in front of abortion clinic entrances and nonviolently discourage access to the
entrances.'"); Veneklase v. City of Fargo, 904 F. Supp. 1038, 1043 (D.N.D. 1995)
(protesters pray outside clinic administrator's home); Horizon Health Ctr. v. Felicissimo, 135
N.J. 126, 132 (1994) (weekly prayer vigils outside clinic entrance used as a means of protest);
Kenneth Jost, Justices Split on Abortion Protest Zones, Tim RECORDER, Oct. 17, 1996, at 1
(describing abortion protest injunction case as "aris[ing] from a campaign by New York anti-
abortion groups in Rochester and Buffalo that stretched over several years [and]
included... prayer vigils").
21 See, e.g., Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1414 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("[P]rotesting
against abortion 'serves a higher and more compelling purpose than that served by traditional
laws against trespass and blocking access to facilities.'"); Anne Kronhauser, An Activist to
Her Bone, 1990 LEGAL ThiEs, July 9, 1990, at 1 ("Anti-abortion protestors believe that a
higher divine law permits, even requires, that they disobey judicial orders, and the hard core
continues to do so."); Alex Martin, iers' War on Abortion, NEWSDAY, May 7, 1990, at 3
(quoting an abortion protester: "I told the judge that I would not obey him, but I would obey
God's law, and he got very mad at me"); Keith H. Sueker, Anti-Abortion Activists Must Obey
Man's Law as Well as God's, PrrrsuRGH Posr-GAzmarE, May 25, 1993, at B2 (responding
to anti-abortion groups' members' claims of "a divine authority that supersedes the law").
22 See, e.g., Abortion Clinics Girdfor Four Days of Protest, ST. Louis Posr-DISPATCII,
July 25, 1995, at 8A (noting that abortion clinics prepared for announced-in-advance
protests).
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to arrest the protesters and often for the entire day.23 Clinics targeted for
protests lose additional business as clients cancel appointments on nonadvertised
days of protest for fear that such protests will nevertheless occur. In one
particular incident, the members are arrested and convicted under the Freedom
of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE)24 of obstructing access to the
clinic.25 Whereas the state law trespass penalty would have been a maximum
three months in jail or $500 fine,26 the federal maximum penalties, because
these individuals have been convicted of the same offense once before, are
$25,000 or eighteen months imprisonment, or both.27 Because they caused both
clinic employees and patients to give up their rights to perform and obtain
medical services out of fear, the two trespasses constitute Hobbs Act
violations, 28 which together form a "pattern of racketeering activity" 29 under
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) chapter of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.30 In addition to establishing the criminal
liability, RICO trebles the civil damages that the clinic may recover from the
protesters. 31
3. On the same day as the abortion clinic incident above, a group of six
women walk into their own Catholic church in which, with the pastor's
permission, a national group dedicated to church reform is scheduled to hold a
meeting. 32 As a means of protesting the organization's reform goals, the
23 See, e.g., Teny, 101 F.3d at 1414 (Anti-abortion protesters participated in "sit-ins"
that "did have the effect, temporarily, of interfering with and blocking access to abortion
facilities.").
24 8 U.S.C. § 248 (1970).
25 See Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Southeastern Pa., Inc. v. Walton, 949 F. Supp. 290,
293 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("[P]rotesters blocking a clinic door as they pray might violate the Act's
prohibition on physical obstraction." (quoting American Life League v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642,
653 (4th Cir. 1995))).
26 See, e.g., Thirty Abortion Opponents Arrested at Arkansas Clinic, N.Y. TMs, July
9, 1994, at 10 (noting that this would incur the state law criminal trespass penalty for blocking
access to an abortion clinic).
27 18 U.S.C. § 248(b) (1970).
28 See, e.g., National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 253 n.2 (1994)
(noting that these were the allegations in the underlying case, but not reaching the issue of
whether they stated a Hobbs Act claim).
29 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1984).
30 Id. §§ 1961-1968.
31 Id. § 1964(a).
32 This hypothetical is based upon news reports of several such protests by six women
calling themselves Les Femmes de Verite (Women of Truth) that took place in the fall of
1995, disrupting meetings of Call to Action, a group that advocated Catholic Church reforms.
See Glen Elsasser, Catholic Tradition, Reform Collide, Cm. TPm., Nov. 24, 1995, at 3; Jim
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women pray loudly, recite the rosary, and cut the microphone cords, thereby
delaying the start of the 200-person meeting. 33 Because the same people had
disrupted a similar meeting at a nearby location, police are in attendance,
observe the disruption, and arrest the protesters.34 Like the clinic protesters, the
Catholic women are charged with violating FACE,35 which, although its title
refers to "clinics," also imposes its enhanced penalties upon anyone who "by
physical obstruction... interferes with or attempts to... interfere with any
person lawfully exercising or seeking to exercise the First Amendment right of
religious freedom at a place of religious worship."36 Although this is only their
second such protest, they will be subject to the enhanced "second offense"
penalties for the latter action if they are first convicted of the earlier disruption.
The two trespasses, aimed at "extorting" the reform organization's right to
conduct its business37 through "force" 38 or "fear," 39 might qualify as Hobbs
Act violations and, because "patterned,"4° subject the women to criminal and
civil RICO liability.41
Keary, Six of Seven Protesters Must Stand Trial, WAsH. TIMEs, Sept. 20, 1995, at C7
[hereinafter Keary, Sir of Seven]; Jim Keary, Women Say Church OK'd Trespassing, WASH.
ToMES, Oct. 20, 1995, at C8.
33 The facts of the actual event are disputed:
[Ihe arresting officer described a chaotic scene .... The parish education minister
testified that she was spit upon and that wires to a microphone were cut amid the
screaming of such epithets as "baby killer" and "gay lover" .... [The defendants]
denied that their actions broke up the meeting, while acknowledging that they talked
openly and recited the rosary.
Elsasser, supra note 32, at 3.
34 See Keary, Si of Seven, supra note 32, at C7.
35 The actual defendants were charged and tried only for.state law trespass, which bears
maximum penalties of a year in jail and a $2500 fine. See Elsasser, supra note 32, at 3.
36 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(2) (1970).
37 See Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1350 (3d Cir.
1989) ("Rights involving the conduct of business are property rights [under the Hobbs
Act].").
38 Cutting the microphone cord might qualify as "force."
39 Coercive speech plus trespass may meet the "fear" requirement. See Antonio J.
Califa, RICO Threatens Civil Liberties, 43 VAND. L. Rnv. 805, 828-29 n.122 (1990).
40 Only two protests can possibly meet the "pattern" requirement if further protests are
likely to occur. See Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 371, 373, 375
(D. Conn. 1989) (finding that two protests had already occurred and that "[t]he Center has
been shown to be a likely target for repetition of the demonstrations"), vacated, 915 F.2d 92
(2d Cir. 1990).
41 The hypothetical protesters might not meet RICO's "enterprise" requirement.
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4. Six members of a group dedicated to environmental preservation decide
to protest what they believe to be too lax United States Forest Service logging
policies.42 As a means of protest, they enter a Forest Service-owned logging
road, climb onto privately owned logging equipment, chain themselves to it,
and affix a banner depicting trees being turned into sawdust. 43 The
demonstration is widely publicized. 44 Because of the protesters' actions, part of
the private company's logging operations are suspended for most of one day.45
The protesters are arrested, convicted of criminal mischief, sentenced to two
weeks in jail, and required to pay a $250 fine and full restitution to the private
company.46 The company files a civil trespass to chattels action.47 The
protesters concede liability for compensatory damages although they dispute the
amount.48 The jury returns a verdict for the company, awarding approximately
$5700 in compensatory damages. 49 Because it also finds it appropriate to
"punish" and "deter" the protesters and discourage them and others from
engaging in "wanton misconduct," 50 the jury also awards $25,000 in punitive
damages.51
These particular applications of presumptively valid penalty enhancement
provisions should be troubling. While it is true that the enhancements apply to
unlawful, constitutionally unprotected conduct that causes nonspeech-related
Although the definition includes "any individual.., or group of individuals associated in
fact," 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1984), lower courts have honed the characteristics to require an
ongoing, structured organization that has an existence "beyond that which is necessary merely
to commit each of the acts charged as predicate racketeering offenses." United States v.
Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 224 (3d Cir. 1983). See also id. at 222 ("Enterprise" requires an
organized structure.); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981) ("Enterprise"
must have some other purpose than only committing the predicate acts.); United States v.
Lemm, 680 F.2d 1193, 1199 (8th Cir. 1982) ("Enterprise" requires a common purpose.).
42 See Huffman & Wright Logging Co. v. Wade, 857 P.2d 101 (1993).
43 The banner also proclaimed "FROM HERITAGE TO SAWDUST-EARTH
FIRST!" Id. at 105.
44 See id.
45 See id.
46 See id.
47 The company alleged that defendants committed a trespass by "intentionally and
wrongfully interfering with and depriving Plaintiff of the use and possession of [its] logging
equipment." Id.
48 See id.
49 The exact amount is $5717.34, whereas the company had asked for $7818.26. See id.
at 105-06.
50 Id. at 118 (Unis, J., dissenting) (reciting the standards under which the jury awarded
punitive damages).
51 See id. at 106.
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harms, in another important respect the above examples are different than the
prototypes that prompted the various types of enhancements. Specifically, in the
above examples the characteristics that trigger application of the enhancements
are not accurate proxies for individually or socially "bad" behavior above and
beyond the base act of lawbreaking. In fact, in the above instances, the
triggering characteristic acts in reverse, identifying and more harshly punishing
particular acts from among the many instances of the same type of unlawful
conduct because of its expressive motivation. That a speech purpose can be the
reason for an enhanced penalty in a certain, identifiable class of cases should
prompt free speech clause scrutiny of the enhancement in these applications.
Part II describes the current state of the law under which penalty
enhancements atop civil disobedience presumptively pose no free speech clause
problem. Part ll.A describes and diagrams the Court's current free speech
clause model. Part II.B places civil disobedience within it. Part II.C explains the
judicial analysis of penalty enhancements that flows from the current free
speech model. This section also details the Court's recent analysis of a hate
crime enhancement and demonstrates how its reasoning has been applied by
lower courts to find other types of penalty enhancements-the federalizing
enhancement of FACE and RICO, and state law punitive damages awards-to
satisfy the free speech clause guarantee, even as applied to political protests.
Part Im describes and diagrams a clarified free speech model under which
civil disobedience is recognized as socially valuable expression and under
which penalty enhancements added to such activities receive the scrutiny that
the free speech clause's spirit requires. Part I.A identifies three ambiguous
points in the current free speech clause model and proposes analytically
coherent clarifications that create a clarified free speech clause model. Parts
M.B and lI.C, respectively, locate civil disobedience and penalty
enhancements within this clarified model.
Part IV explains how penalty enhancements apply to civil disobedience
under the clarified free speech clause model. Part IV.A argues that numerous
factors in the constitutional balance presumptively protect civil disobedience
from penalty enhancement. Nevertheless, a government showing that the
expressive act at issue indeed results in special noncommunicative harms,
distinguishing it from the base acts of lawbreaking that lack the enhancement
trigger, or that a strong interest in uniform enforcement of the enhancement
may justify it in a particular application. Part IV.B balances civil disobedience's
expressive value with the government's interest in the context of the various
types of penalty enhancements discussed in the Article.
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I. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND PENALTY ENHANCEMENTS WITHIN THE
CURRENT FREE SPEECH CLAUSE MODEL
A. The Current Free Speech Model
Constitutional theory divides the realm of potentially protected "speech"
under the free speech clause of the First Amendment into two fundamental
categories. The first category, speech or pure speech, 52 covers expression
through words, either verbally or in writing;53 it also covers activities that in
many manifestations are means of communication, even though that is not
always their purpose.54 The line between speech and conduct has evolved over
the years, mostly by means of pronouncement. 55 Its exact boundaries continue
to be "sometimes hazy." 56
The other broad category, conduct, breaks down into two subcategories,
expressive conduct and nonexpressive conduct.57 To be expressive, conduct
must at least be intended to communicate a message. 58 But this alone is not
52 'Me Court tends to use these terms interchangeably. Corpare Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396, 411 (1974) (describing O'Brien's draft card burning as involving "'conduct'
rather than pure 'speech'") with United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)
(ditinguishing "speech" and "conduct").
53 See GERALD GUNTHER, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN CoNsrITrIoNAL LAw 957-58 (5th
ed. 1991); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (assuming that the First
Amendment "speech" protection extends to the "spoken or written word").
54 See LAuuaNcE H. TIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTONAL LAW 829-30 (2d ed. 1988)
(listing these activities as "outdoor distribution of leaflets or pamphlets; door-to-door political
canvassing; solicitation of contributions, wherever it takes place; mailbox-stuffig; picketing;
civil rights demonstations and boycotts; communicating with government; putting up outdoor
posters or signs").
55 Compare Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563-64 (1965) (Protest demonstration is
conduct.) with Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (Protest demonstration
is a "pristine and classic form" of free speech activity.); compare O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376
(stating that draft card burning is conduct) with Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 505 (1969) (wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War is "closely akin to pure
speech").
56 Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 55 (1982); see also TIBE, supra note 54, at 827
("Mhe Supreme Court has never articulated a basis for its distinction; it could not do so, with
the result that any particular course of conduct may be hung almost randomly on the 'speech'
peg or the 'conduct' peg as one sees fit.").
57 See Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 703, 705 (1986) ("dstinguishing
cases "involving governmental regulation of conduct that has an expressive element" from
activities that "manifest[ ] absolutely no element of protected expression").
58 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (per curiam) (requiring as
the first prong of its two-prong test for symbolic conduct that there be "[a]n intent to convey a
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sufficient. 59 The message must be reasonably likely to be understood by an
audience.6° Nude dancing in a private club, when claimed by its performers
and audience to convey a message, may be expressive conduct, although "only
marginally so." 6 1 Physical assault, however, cannot "by any stretch of the
imagination" be constitationally protected expressive conduct despite the fact
that its perpetrator may intend to convey a message that an audience might
reasonably understand. 62 Thus, like the boundary between speech and conduct,
the line between expressive and nonexpressive conduct remains murky.
Free speech clause analysis differs according to the category of activity
affected by government action. Government restriction of speech activities63
generally triggers more rigorous scrutiny than government restriction of
conduct. 64 The exception is when the government, although ostensibly
regulating conduct, targets its expressive element.65 This governmental purpose
particularized message").
59 See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 ("We cannot accept the view that an apparently
limitless variety of conduct can be labeled as 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the
conduct intends thereby to express an idea.").
60 See Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11 (requiring as the second in its two-prong test for
symbolic conduct a likelihood "that the message would be understood by those who viewed
it").
61 Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991).
62 See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993).
63 Government restriction of individual speech must be distinguished from speech by the
government, either through its figureheads or through funding of expression, which, because
it does not "abridge [individual's] freedom of speech," does not invoke free speech clause
review. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833
(1995) ("[W]e have permitted the government to regulate the content of what is or is not
expressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its own
message."); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991). In Rust, the Supreme Court stated
that:
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to
encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same
time funding an alternate program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.
In so doing, the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has
merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.
Id.
64 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) ("The government generally has a
freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken
word.-).
65 See id. (noting that the government may not "proscribe particular conduct because it
has expressive elements"); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (applying its
lenient balancing test to a government regulation that incidentally restricts expressive conduct
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to restrict expression invokes the more rigorous "speech" analysis in the
constitutional framework. 66
According to the Court's articulations, even when the government does not
target its expressive element, there is a difference between the analysis of
expressive and nonexpressive conduct.67 In fact, the Court has claimed to apply
the same balancing test to government actions that restrict expressive conduct as
it does to government actions that restrict the time, place, or manner of speech
activities without respect to their content. 68 In application, however, there is a
real difference between the balancing test used for content neutral speech
restrictions and restrictions of expressive conduct, but there is no real difference
between the analysis of expressive and nonexpressive conduct restrictions. 69
Where conduct is deemed expressive, three prongs remain in the articulated
test: whether the action is within the government's power, whether the action
serves an important or substantial governmental purpose, and whether the
incidental restriction of speech is no greater than necessary to serve the
when "the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression"); Michael
C. Doff, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1176, 1202 (1996)
(noting that the requirement that a government regulation of conduct be unrelated to the
suppression of free expression is "a precondition for the application of the test in the first
instance").
66 See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317-18 (1990) (observing that
because the Flag Protection Act of 1989 "suffer[ed] from the ... fundamental flaw [of]
suppress[ing] expression out of concern for its likely communicative impact... [it] must be
subjected to 'the most exacting scrutiny'" (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321
(1988))).
67 If conduct is nonexpressive, it is not "speech" and therefore does not trigger free
speech clause analysis. See Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 484-86 (implying that because a physical
assault cannot be expressive conduct, a penalty for that act alone would not trigger free speech
clause analysis). If conduct is at least presumptively expressive, the Court purports to balance
the government's interest in regulating the conduct against the "incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms." OThien, 391 U.S. at 377.
68 See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) ("TMhe
[O'Brien] test 'in the last analysis is little, if any, different from the standard applied to time,
place, or manner restrictions.'" (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984))).
69 See, e.g., Ely, supra note 3, at 1488-89 (distinguishing between "serious balancing"
that occurs when a content neutral law restricts "relatively familiar" means of expression,
which the Court categorizes as speech, from the highly deferential standard that applies to
activities that the Court categorizes as expressive conduct); Keith Werhan, The O'Briening of
Free Speech Methodology, 19 Amiz. ST. L.J. 635, 641 (1987) (noting that the expressive
conduct analysis offers "little more than the minimal rational-basis test applied in economic
due process cases").
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government's purpose.70 The first prong is implicit in any constitutional
inquiry.71 And, although the second and the third prong sound more demanding
than the rational basis standard, which requires only a legitimate government
purpose and a reasonable means/end fit, in the Court's application they are
not.72 The judicial inquiry as to purpose does not extend beyond its
legitimacy.73 Once the legitimacy of a conduct-directed purpose is established,
the means, unless perversely chosen without regard to their end, will
undoubtedly be reasonably tailored to serve it.74 This final conclusion then
justifies the restriction of expression that, because the government action is not
70 See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
71 See Doff, supra note 65, at 1202 ("Prong one [of the expressive conduct test] is not
properly part of First Amendment law, because all regulation must be within the
government's constitutional power.").
72 See, e.g., id. at 1204 (noting that the expressive conduct test formally resembles
conventional intermediate scmtiny, but is, in actuality, "toothless"); Frederick Schauer,
Cuban Cigars, Cuban Books, and the Problem of Incidental Restrictions on Communications,
26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 779, 787-88 (1985) (same); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral
Restrictions, 54 U. Cn. L. REv. 46, 52 (1987) (same). But see STvEN SHIFw, THm Fmsr
AMENDMENT, DEMOCPACY AND ROMANCE 29 n.97, 33 n.122 (1990) (arguing that the
O'Brien test has bite as applied by the lower federal courts).
73 See, e.g., Dean Alfange, Jr., Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-Card
Burning Case, 1968 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 1-52 ("The Court's use of 'substantial,' therefore,
[with respect to the government interest] is more appropriate if the term is understood in its
sense of 'having substance' or 'not imaginary,' rather than the sense of 'considerable' or
'large.'"). In its most recent expressive conduct case, the Court held that despite its incidental
restriction of any expressive element in totally nude dancing, "the public indecency statute
furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality." Barnes v. Glen
Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991). In support of this conclusion, it recited the long
history of public indecency statutes and quoted from several cases dealing with the legitimacy,
rather than the substantiality, of morals legislation. See id. (discussing Paris Adult Theater I
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973) ("[A] legislature could legitimately act on such a conclusion
to protect 'the social interest in order and morality.'") and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 196 (1986) (reviewing the state's justification for its anti-sodomy law under a rational
basis standard)). Thus, although the Court clings to the word "substantial," which purports to
elevate the O'Brien standard from mere rationality review, its results remain consistent: A
rational conduct-directed government purpose will justify incidental restriction of purportedly
expressive conduct.
74 See, e.g., Ely, supra note 3, at 1484-85 (noting that the expressive conduct test's
tailoring prong requires only "that there be no less restrictive alternative capable of serving
the state's interest as efficiently as it is served by the regulation under attack"). Once the
government's speech-directed motive is removed from the inquiry and an alternate, conduct-
directed purpose established, the question boils down to whether the government has chosen
reasonable means to address the conduct. Almost always, the government will be found to
have done so because addressing the conduct was its purpose.
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targeted at expression, is only "incidental." 75 Thus, once it is determined that a
government regulation of conduct is not directed at expression, whether the
conduct is expressive or nonexpressive does not significantly affect the analysis.
The inquiry in both instances approximates the deferential rational basis
standard.
Along the speech route, the relevant question is whether the government
action is directed at the content of the message. 76 If so, strict scrutiny applies,77
unless the government is regulating speech on its own property that it has not
opened for expression78 or unless the content of the speech falls within one of
the categories that the Court had determined to be entirely unprotected, 79 or
less protected than most speech.80 The government may entirely suppress
unprotected speech8 l and may suppress less protected speech subject to a less
75 See generally Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulaions of
Speech and Free Speech Theory, 44 HASIGs L.J. 921, 933-45 (1993) (discussing incidental
burdens on speech); Doff, supra note 65, at 1200-10 (same); Susan H. Williams, Content
Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 615, 722-28 (1991) (same).
76 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("Content-based
regulations are presumptively invalid."); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95
(1972) ("[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.").
77 See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) ("As a facially content-
based restriction on political speech in a public forum, [a Tennessee law creating a 100-foot
solicitation-free zone around polling places] must be subjected to exacting scrutiny ....");
R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 395 ("[Tihe 'danger of censorship' presented by a facially content-based
statute requires that the weapon be employed only where it is 'necessary to serve [an] asserted
[compelling] interest.'" (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992) (plurality
opinion))).
7 8 See Perry Educators' Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)
(distinguishing between quintessential public forums and limited public forums, to which strict
scrutiny review of content discriminations apply, and nonpublic forums, which the
government "may reserve... for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long
as the regulation of speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely
because public officials oppose the speaker's view").
7 9 These categories include speech that incites imminent lawless action, see Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), fighting words, see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942), libel, see New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and obscenity,
see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
80 These categories include sexually explicit speech, see FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726 (1978); Young v. American Mini-Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), and commercial
speech, see Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
81 See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383 (clarifying that content discriminations beyond the
"distinctively proscribable content" that defines the class of unprotected speech invoke free
speech clause scrutiny); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 ("There are certain well-defined and
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rigorous balancing inquiry82 because the Court has determined that the
particular type of speech within these limited categories is of lesser social value
than fully protected speech.83
Only a compelling interest and means narrowly tailored to meet it will
justify a content-based regulation of protected speech.84 Almost every
government action will fail this demanding test.85 Where a government action is
content-neutral, regulating the time, place, or manner of speech rather than its
message, the analysis is a balancing test8 6 that weighs the legitimacy and
importance of the government interest, 87 the availability and adequacy of
alternate means for the government to promote the interest, 88 the speech-
reducing impact of the government action, 89 the availability and adequacy of
alternate means of speech,90 traditions associated with the place of
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem.").
82 See, e.g., Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569-70 ("'The critical inquiry' is whether the
Commission's complete suppression of [commercial] speech ordinarily protected by the First
Amendment is no more extensive than necessary to further the State's interest.").
83 See R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 383 ("Tihese areas of speech can, consistently with the First
Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable cont .... ");
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (stating that such expression is "of such slight social value as a
step to truth than any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality").
84 See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
85 See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382 (holding that "content-based restrictions are
presumptively invalid"). But see Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (upholding a
state law 100-foot no-solicitation zone around polling places under the strict scrutiny
standard).
86 See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 526-27 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (assuming that an ordinance banning almost all outdoor billboards is content-
neutral, it is still necessary "to assess the 'substantiality of the governmental interests
asserted' and 'whether those interests could be served by means that would be less intrusive
on activity protected by the First Amendment... .'" (quoting Schad v. Mt. Ephram, 452
U.S. 61, 70 (1981); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143-49 (1943))).
87 See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (noting the need "to appraise
the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation").
88 See id. at 162 ("There are obvious methods of preventing littering [other than
prohibiting the distribution of leaflets]."); Martin, 319 U.S. at 146-48 (noting that rather than
prohibiting any door-to-door solicitation for the purpose of [distributing] handbills, "the city
[clould make it an offense for any person to ring the bell of a householder who has
appropriately indicated that he is unwilling to be disturbed").
89 See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54 (1994) ("Ladue has almost completely
foreclosed a venerable means of communication that is both unique and important.").
90 See id. at 56 (noting that "even regulations [of] time, place, or manner [must] 'leave
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expression-has it traditionally been open for public communrications? 9L--and
the affect of the regulation on discrete groups-does the restriction
disproportionately silence speakers without the means to pay for more
expensive modes of communication? 92 Government actions fall on either side of
this test with reasonable frequency. 93 Diagram A graphically portrays the
current free speech clause model.
open ample alternative channels for communication'" (quoting Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984))); Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 562-63
(Burger, J., dissenting) ("The messages conveyed on San Diego billboards [can] ... reach an
equally large audience through a variety of other media.. . ."); Kovacs v. Coopers, 336
U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (noting that the anti-noise ordinance at issue did not "restrict the
communication of ideas or discussion of issues by the human voice, by newspapers, by
pamphlets, by dodgers").
91 See City of Ladue, 512 U.S. at 58 ("A special respect for individual liberty in the
home has long been part of our culture and our law; that principle has special resonance when
the government seeks to constrain a person's ability to speak there."); Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 87
("City streets are recognized as a normal place for the exchange of ideas .... "); Hague v.
C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) ("Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions.").
92 See City of Ladue, 512 U.S. at 57 (Residential signs "are an unusually cheap and
convenient form of communication."); Martin, 319 U.S. at 146 (Door-to-door solicitation "is
essential to the poorly financed causes of little people.").
93 See City of Ladue, 512 U.S. at 58-59 (invalidating residential no-sign); Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 776 (1994) (upholding and invalidating parts of an
injunction against anti-abortion protesters under an elevated time, place, and manner
standard); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989) (upholding anti-noise
ordinance); Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 517-21 (invalidating no-billboard ordinance).
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B. The Place of Civil Disobedience in the Current Free Speech Model
Civil disobedience is expression conveyed through the means of breaking
the law.94 Although words may be part of civil disobedience, its most
fundamental message is the symbolic statement that comes from deliberately
illegal action.95 Thus, according to the Court's speech/conduct dichotomy,
lawbreaking is conduct.96
Exactly how the Court's analysis would proceed after this initial
categorization is less clear. Under its two-pronged test that looks to speaker
intent and audience perception, 97 civil disobedience should, by definition, be
expressive conduct. 98 The Court's recent implication that physical assault
cannot be expressive conduct,99 however, casts doubt on this conclusion
because it could be read to lump "other types of potentially expressive activities
that produce special harms distinct from their communicative impact"' 00 into
this conclusion-specifically, all acts that break a nonspeech-directed law.101
Thus perhaps civil disobedience would be classified as per se nonexpressive
94 See, e.g., RAwLs, supra note 11, at 366 ("One may compare [civil disobedience] to
public speech... ."); Ernest van den Hagg, Disobedience and the Law, 21 RuTGERs L.
REv. 27, 27 (1966) ("[C]ivil disobedience [occurs] when a law is deliberately disobeyed to
publicly demonstrate opposition, on moral grounds, to laws or policies of the government.").
95 See Peter Meijes Tiersma, Nonverbal Conmnmication and the Freedom of "Speech",
1993 Wis. L. REV. 1525, 1586 (differentiating "ordinary violations of law" from
"disobedience [that is] communicative").
96 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) (analyzing draft card burning
as conduct).
97 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 408-15 (1974).
98 See, e.g., Morris Keeton, The Morality of Civil Disobedience, 43 TEx. L. REv. 507,
508 (1965) ("[The] act of civil disobedience [is] ... an act of deliberate and open violation of
law with the intent, within the framework of the prevailing form of government, to protest a
wrong or to accomplish some betterment in the society.").
99 See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 483 (1993).
100 Id. at 484 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984)).
101 Like the Supreme Court, lower courts seem often to merge the
expressive/nonexpressive and protected/unprotected categorizations. See, e.g., National Org.
for Women v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 616 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Although the defendants' acts
generated publicity which they may have hoped would influence governmental actors, this
tangential contact is not sufficient to invoke First Amendment protection for otherwise
criminal behavior."). Although concurring in the reversal of the decision on appeal, Justices
Souter and Kennedy echoed the theme that illegal action is outside the First Amendment
without distinguishing between the expressive/nonexpressive and protected/unprotected
categorizations. See National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 264 (1994)
(repeatedly stating that the application of RICO to acts of political protest would pose a
constitutional problem if it chilled "fully protected" activity).
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conduct because it produces the noncommunicative harms that stem from the
functional act of breaking the law, 102 and the free speech clause inquiry would
be over. 103
But under the current free speech model, the distinction between expressive
and nonexpressive conduct does not really matter. Even if the Court was
willing to view civil disobedience as expressive conduct, free speech clause
analysis would terminate almost as quickly. 104 As noted above, the only
question that triggers any substantial level of analysis of conduct-directed
government action is whether that action is directed at the speech component of
the impacted conduct.105 If so, the government's action becomes highly
suspect. If not, judicial deference kicks in-the action is valid according to an
inquiry that is the functional equivalent to rational basis scrutiny.10 6
This expressive conduct model leaves no place to consider or weigh the
value of the speech lost when the government prohibits civilly disobedient
lawbreaking. 107 Only a government speech-directed motive prompts substantial
analysis. The civil disobedient's protest, however, is not that the law broken is
unconstitutionally speech-directed. To the contrary, it is most often a
nonspeech-directed government action that the civil disobedient protests. A
motivating reason for the protest may well be the precision of fit between the
government's ends and means and the law's effectiveness in bringing about its
intended nonspeech-related result. Moreover, the means of lawbreaking is often
102 Even trespassory protests that result in no property damage invade property rights,
which is a distinct, noncommunicative harm.
The interest in exclusive possession of land is distinct from the interests in physical
integrity and actual enjoyment of the land.... The rightful possessor may insist that
others not enter the land even if the possessor is not physically present on the land, is not
using it, and is not harmed in any tangible way by another's entry or use.
DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF RmDEs 786-87 (2d ed. 1993).
10 3 See Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 707 (1986) (noting that free speech
clause analysis does not apply "to a statute directed at imposing sanctions on nonexpressive
activity"). The minimum economic due process rational basis scrutiny would remain, as it
does for any government action.
104 This perhaps explains why the Court so carelessly lumped the
expressive/nonexpressive and the protected/unprotected categorizations together in
Mitchell-careful analysis of the first question did not matter because the conclusion that the
conduct was ultimately unprotected was so clear.
105 See supra notes 65-466 and accompanying text.
106 See discussion supra Part I.A.
107 See, e.g., Werhan, supra note 69, at 641 ("There is no speech side to the Court's
balance.").
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a concession that current legal limits on the scope of government power are
insufficient to constrain it in the way the civil disobedient believes
appropriate.' 08 Thus, the same factors that motivate the civil disobedient's
protest are what validate the government action in the current free speech
clause analysis.
C. The Place of Various Types of Penalty Enhancements Within the
Current Free Speech Clause Model
Several broad principles from the current free speech model guide judicial
analysis of penalty enhancement provisions. The first is that judicial scrutiny
under the free speech clause is appropriate only if the government action
genuinely impacts expression. Under the speech/conduct dichotomy, penalty
enhancement provisions apply to base conduct that breaks a preexisting law. In
most instances, such lawbreaking is not expression. Rather, it is individually
and socially harmful activity engaged in for nonspeech-related reasons that the
government has the right and responsibility to punish and deter. Thus, in most
applications, penalty enhancements work upon base acts of lawbreaking that
have neither the purpose nor the effect of suppressing expression.
A second principle from the current free speech model that guides judicial
analysis of penalty enhancements is that a governmental intent to suppress
expression is the most fundamental constitutional evil. 109 Thus, even when an
act of lawbreaking is allegedly expression, if, as will almost always be the case,
its definition is expression-neutral, government intent to suppress expression
will be lacking. 110 According to the current free speech model, all that will
remain is the far lesser evil of an unintended impact on expression."'
108 See, e.g., Gene Warner, Activists Will Take Case to Public with Lecture About
Government Abuse, Civil Disobedience, BuFFALo NEws, Mar. 23, 1997, at 6B (Civil
disobedience advocates lecture on the topic "When the law is wrong, when the government is
a bully, what can you do?").
109 See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 792 (1989) ("The principal
inquiry... in speech cases ... is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech
because of disagreement with the message it conveys."); see also Elena Kagan, Private
Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63
U. Cm. L. REv. 413, 413-517 (1996) (arguing "that First Amendment law, as developed by
the Supreme Court over the past several decades, has as its primary, though unstated, object
the discovery of improper governmental motives").
11o See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) ("It is a familiar
principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional
statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.").
111 See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 763 (1994) ("Mhe fact
that the injunction covered people with a particular viewpoint does not itself render the
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Moreover, because the base act is illegal for nonspeech-related reasons, it
presumptively results in nonspeech-related harms that the government may
lawfully prohibit. Under the current free speech clause model, these legitimate
governmental objectives fulfiled by defining certain acts as unlawful outweigh
any alleged impact on expression resulting from those definitions.
The third important analytical principle from the current free speech clause
model is that the breadth of scope of a penalty enhancement provision helps
insulate it from constitutional challenge. 112 Although a broad penalty
enhancement provision may suppress more potentially expressive actions than a
more narrow one, its breadth provides the crucial guarantee that the
government did not purposely target particular viewpoints for suppression.1 1 3
Both these principles and the facts to which penalty enhancements are
usually applied combine to form a strong judicial presumption that particular
penalty enhancements are consistent with the Constitution's free speech
guarantee.
1. Hate Crime Penalty Enhancement Statutes
The Court recently reviewed the quintessential penalty enhancement-a
legislative decision to augment the punishment for certain acts when the
perpetrator commits them for a particular reason. The state statute at issue in
Wisconsin v. Mitchell114 provided for greater penalties for a range of previously
defined crimes115 when the actor "intentionally selects" his victim "because of'
injunction content or viewpoint based.").
112 See, e.g., James Weinstein, Hate Crime and Punishment: A Comment on Wisconsin
v. Mitchell, 73 OR. L. REV. 345, 363-64 (1994) (distinguishing an enhancement "that
expressly refers to the defendant's views on abortion, a highly charged political issue" or one
"that expressly referred to crimes committed in opposition to the United States' military's
reprisals against Iraq" from "the Wisconsin law at issue in Mitchell" that "does not refer to
political ideology, but rather to selection of the victim on the basis of race, religion, or other
protected status" and therefore may include those who act from other than racist motives).
113 See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51 (1994) ("[A]n exemption from an
otherwise permissible regulation of speech may represent a government 'attempt to give one
side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people.'"
(quoting First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 785-86 (1978))); Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 459-71 (1980) (asserting that regulatory distinctions between different
kinds of speech may violate the Equal Protection Clause); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 98-102 (1972) (same).
114 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
115 These crimes range from low level misdemeanors such as trespass, for which the
maximum penalty increases to a fine of $10,000 and imprisonment of up to one year, to
felonies, for which the maximum fine may be increased by up to $5000 and themaximum
length of imprisonment increased by up to five years. See Wis. STAT. § 939.645 (1989-
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certain physical characteristics, including race.116 Under the Wisconsin statute,
motive translates into enhanced punishment.
The United States Supreme Court upheld the statute against a claim that the
motive-based enhancement unconstitutionally penalized free expression.117
First, the Court noted in an ambiguous conflation of two constitutional
concepts 18 that the base act of assault to which the penalty enhancement
attached was not "expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment." 119 It
then severed the enhancement from the unprotected base act for constitutional
analysis, 120 noting that the state supreme court had found its motive trigger to
unconstitutionally punish "offenders' bigoted beliefs." 12 1
In rejecting the state supreme court's analysis, the Court's reasoning
evidences the general principles of the current free speech clause model. The
Court relied upon the speech/conduct distinction in several ways. First, the
Court found a constitutionally relevant difference between a criminal
defendant's abstract beliefs, which the government may not punish, 122 and
motive connected to unlawful action. 1 23 Motive is relevant to judges in setting
1990).
116 More fully, the Wisconsin penalty enhancement statute increases the punishment
whenever the defendant "[i]ntentionally selects the person against whom the crime... is
committed or selects the property which is damaged or otherwise affected by the
crime... because of the... race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national
origin or ancestry of that person or the owner or occupant of that property." Wis. STAT.
§ 939.645 (1989-1990), cited in Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 480.
117 The Wisconsin Supreme Court had accepted this argument. See State v. Mitchell,
485 N.W.2d 807, 811 (Wis. 1992) (stating that the statute "violates the First Amendment
directly by punishing what the legislature has deemed to be offensive thought").
118 See F EDmucK SCHAUER, FREE SPEEC-: A PHILosopIcAL ENQUIRY 89-91 (1982)
(emphasizing the difference between constitutional coverage and protection); Tiersma, supra
note 95, at 1528 ("If conduct is covered by the First Amendment, it comes within its scope
and at least some constitutional scrutiny is called for. Once conduct is covered, however, the
courts must still determine the level of protection it will receive." (citing SCHAUER, supra, at
89-91)).
119 Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 484.
120 Id. at 485 ("[A]Ithough the statute punishes criminal conduct, it enhances the
maximum penalty for conduct motivated by a discriminatory point of view more severely than
the same conduct engaged in for some other reason or for no reason at all.").
121 Id.
122 See id. ("[A] defendant's abstract beliefs, however obnoxious to most people, may
not be taken into consideration by a sentencing judge." (citing Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S.
159 (1992))).
123 See id. at 486 (distinguishing evidence of group membership that "proved nothing
more than... abstract beliefs" from the same evidence when it showed "racial animus
toward the victim" and was therefore "related to" the crime).
[Vol. 59:185
APPLYING PENALTY ENHANCEMENTS
the level of punishment for an offense because some reasons for acting are
"good" and others "bad."124 Moreover, motive may be a proxy for purposeful
lawbreaking, which according to "[d]eeply ingrained... legal tradition" ought
to be more severely punished.125 The Court noted that motive plays the same
role in the penalty enhancement statute as it does in state and federal anti-
discrimination statutes: In both instances motive correlates to the
"reason ... for acting,"' 2 6 a legitimate basis for distinguishing between the
same functional conduct.
Second, the Court distinguished its previous decision invalidating a local
hate crime ordinance as unconstitutionally message-directed and content-
based, 127 which had formed the basis for the state supreme court's holding.' 2 8
While the invalid ordinance "was explicitly directed at expression," the penalty
enhancement statute was "aimed at conduct unprotected by the First
Amendment." 129
Third, the Court credited the state's assertion that racially motivated crimes
are likely to "inflict greater individual and social harm" than the same conduct
engaged in based upon other motivations. 130 These harms and the State's desire
to redress them "provides an adequate explanation for its penalty-enhancement
provision over and above mere disagreement with offenders' beliefs or
124 Id. at 485 ("[l~t is not uncommon for a defendant to receive a minimum sentence
because he was acting with good motives, or a rather high sentence because of his bad
motives." (quoting 1W. LEFAVE & A. ScoTr, Su TAn ECR 4IALLAW § 3.6(b), at 324
(1986))).
125 Id. (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987)).
126 Id. at 487.
127 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
12 8 See State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 815 (Wis. 1992) (relying upon R.A.V. to
characterize the Wisconsin statute as "criminaliz[ing] bigoted thought with which [the
legislare] disagrees").
129 Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487 (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377). The St. Paul ordinance
prohibited the display of a symbol that one knows or has reason to know "arouses anger,
alarm or resentment in others" on the basis of certain, specified characteristics, including
race. The defendant in that case had placed a burning cross on an African American family's
lawn. The Court assumed that the ordinance applied only to "fighting words," which, as a
constitutionally unprotected category of speech, the city could proscribe entirely. However,
because St. Paul proscribed only a subset of fighting words based upon the content of their
message, the Court invalidated the ordinance. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391 ("The First
Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who
express views on disfavored subjects.").
130 Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 488 ("[Blias-motivated crimes are more likely to provoke
retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on their victims, and incite community
unrest.").
1998]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
biases."1 31 This reason translates into an assurance that the penalty
enhancement comports with what the current model deems the crux of the free
speech guarantee-that the government not act with a speech-suppressing
motive.
These reasons end the Court's analysis. However, another of the current
model's broad principles implicitly underlies its result. Most likely the Court
did not perceive the Wisconsin statute to discriminate between political points of
view.1 32 Although undoubtedly aimed to prevent hate crimes, the penalty
enhancement was broad enough to encompass crimes motivated by other than
"bigoted thought." 133 As with the existence of special harms that flow from the
motivation, the breadth of motive under the current model provides an
important guarantee that the government is not engaging in purposeful,
viewpoint discriminatory action.
Beyond theory, the facts before the Mitchell Court most likely contributed
to its broad pronouncements. The defendant in that case was convicted of the
base crime of aggravated battery 34 for inciting a group of African American
friends to attack a young boy because he was white. Aggravated battery is a
crime because it produces significant individual and social harms. Physical
assault is not normally a means of expression, nor was it a means of expression
in this particular case. Moreover, even if it is a means of expression in a
particular instance, the governmental interest in preventing the resulting harms
would outweigh the free speech right. Thus, there was nothing about the
particular base activity that would render it constitutionally protected in that
case or in any conceivable manifestation. Moreover, the motive that led to the
penalty enhancement-targeting the victim because of his race-plausibly
showed purposefulness of action, which is a traditional reason for enhancing
punishment, as well as the possibility of greater social harms than physical
131 Id.
132 See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Rues of Engagement for Cultural Wars: Regulating
Conduct, Unprotected Speech, and Protected Expression in Anti-Abortion Protests, 29 U.C.
DAviS L. REv. 553, 631 (1996) ("It is hard to believe that the Court would uphold a
[viewpoint discriminatory penalty enhancement, although] ... the reasoning of Mitchell
technically leaves this issue open. .... ").
133 See, e.g., id. at 630 ("I]he law in Mitchell... would seem to involve content
discrimination not viewpoint discrimination, to the extent that it involves discrimination
related to expression at all."); Weinstein, supra note 112, at 364 ("Far from referring to any
identifiable political or social ideology, such as white separatism or black nationalism, the
Wisconsin statute does not even require that the defendant act with a racist motive. Racial
motive will suffice.").
134 Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 480 (citing Wis. STAT. §§ 939.05 & 940.19(lm) (1989-
1990)).
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assaults motivated by other reasons. 135 Quite simply, where a group of men and
teenagers beat a young boy unconscious out of racial hatred, neither the base
act nor the penalty enhancement justify free speech clause protection.
2. Federalizing Statutes
a. Target-Specific Enhancement: The Free Access to Clinic Entrances
Act
Like the Wisconsin penalty enhancement statute, the Freedom of Access to
Clinic Entrances Act (FACE) augments the punishment for certain conduct
because of the actor's motive. FACE prohibits the use of "force or threat of
force" or "physical obstruction" that "intentionally injures, intimidates, or
interferes... with any person because that person... has been ... obtaining
or providing reproductive health services." 136 FACE's penalties for the targeted
conduct that falls within its provisions are generally more severe than existing
state law penalties. 137 In fact, enhancing the penalties was the purpose for
federalizing the class of state law crimes. 138
The lower courts that have reviewed FACE have found its penalty
enhancements valid according to the general principles that underlie the current
free speech clause model. 139 Most crucially, in the courts' perceptions, the
135 The facts of the case well illustrate at least one of the additional social harms alleged
to flow from race-targeted actions-provoking retaliatory action, as the assault itself seems to
have been in "retaliation" for the race-based assault depicted in the film, Mississippi Burning.
See id.
136 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) (1994) (emphasis added). Despite its name, a late amendment
protects access to places of religious worship in the same ways. See id. § 248(a)(2).
137 FACE generally authorizes fines of $15,000 or one-year jail terms, or both, for first
violations and $25,000 or three-year jail terms, or both, for subsequent violations. If bodily
injury results, FACE authorizes imprisonment of up to ten years, and if death results, it
authorizes an unlimited term. See id. § 248(b). For "nonviolent physical obstruction" the
fines are somewhat reduced-$10,000 or six months, or both, for first violations and $25,000
or 18 months, or both, for subsequent violations. See id. It also authorizes private civil actions
for fees and damages according to proof or in a statutory amount of $5000 per violation. See
id. § 248(c)(1).
138 See S. RnP. No. 103-117, at 20 (1993) (noting that the "problem with reliance on
state and local laws is that the penalties for violations of these laws are often so low as to
provide little if any deterrent effect").
139 See, e.g., Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v.
Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir.
1996); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995); Woodall v. Reno, 47 F.3d 656 (4th
Cir. 1995); American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1995); Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Walten, 949 F. Supp. 290 (E.D. Pa. 1996); United States
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trigger for FACE liability is actions, 140 most of which were already unlawful
for nonspeech-based reasons. 141 These actions are not normally means of
expression and have "physical consequences that are independent of symbolic
significance.' 142 These nonspeech-related harms justify the government's initial
decision to make the base functional acts unlawful. Thus, like the base state law
penalties, the federalizing enhancement applies to constitutionally unprotected
conduct. 143 The crucial question then with respect to the additional punishment
that the federal law provides is whether it unconstitutionally discriminates as to
viewpoint. Here, the reviewing courts have explicitly relied upon the breadth of
FACE's motive trigger to uphold its provisions. That FACE's penalty
enhancements apply to actions beyond those that prompted its enactment is
important evidence that it complies with the free speech guarantee. 144
By contrast to its theoretical breadth, the facts to which FACE has been
applied have largely paralleled those specifically envisioned by its proponents.
That is, in most applications, FACE's motive-based enhancements plausibly
correlate to knowing violations of individual rights1 45 as well as identifying
v. Lucero, 895 F. Supp. 1421 (D. Kan. 1995); United States v. White, 893 F. Supp. 1423
(C.D. Cal. 1995); United States v. Brock, 863 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. Wis. 1994); Riely v.
Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693 (D. Ariz. 1994); Cook v. Reno, 859 F. Supp. 1008 (W.D. La.
1994); Council for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422 (S.D. Cal. 1994).
140 See, e.g., Teny, 101 F.3d at 1418 (FACE "prohibits three types of conduct: use of
force, threat of force, and physical obstruction."). But see Brownstein, supra note 132, at
556-84 (arguing that FACE's threat prohibition impacts pure speech and therefore that the
constitutional analysis does not fall squarely within Mitchell's reasoning, proposing an
alternate analysis that ultimately reaches the same conclusion as the courts).
141 FACE criminalizes three types of activities-"force," "threat[s] of force," and
"physical obstruction." 18 U.S.C. § 248(a) (1994). Acts of force would already be unlawful
under state laws prohibiting acts of violence to persons or property. Threats of force would
already be unlawful under various state laws prohibiting intimidation and harassment.
Physical obstruction would be unlawful under trespass laws to the extent it interferes with
property rights. Perhaps some acts of physical obstruction would not have a state law
equivalent.
14 2 Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1375.
143 See Teny, 101 F.3d at 1418 ("[FACE] does not target protected speech.").
144 See, e.g., id. at 1419 (FACE "would apply to an individual who spray paints the
words 'KEEP ABORTION LEGAL' on a facility providing counseling regarding abortion
alternatives as well as to the individual who spray paints the words 'DEATH CAMP' on a
facility providing abortion services." (quoting Reily, 860 F. Supp. at 702)); DinwMdie, 76
F.3d at 923 ("FACE would prohibit striking employees from obstructing access to a clinic in
order to stop women from getting abortions, even if the workers were carrying signs that
said, 'We are underpaid!' rather than 'Abortion is wrong!'").
14 5 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Walton, 949 F. Supp. 290, 293
(E.D. Pa. 1996) (noting that FACE's stated purpose is "to protect and promote public safety
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actions with greater potential for individual and social harm. 146 Moreover, the
lower courts reviewing the constitutionality of FACE are armed with its
legislative history detailing the acts of sabotage and violence that prompted the
statute. 147 Where the facts in their particular cases involve personally directed
violence or threats of violence, they parallel the egregious facts cited by
Congress. In these contexts, the social value of political protest motivation pales
in comparison to the individual and social harm of the actual or threatened
violence.148
Although "physical obstruction" may be nonviolent in particular
manifestations, 49 both the history of violent interference and threatening
intimidation with clinic patients and personnel and the frequent tendency of
potentially peaceful acts of physical obstruction to include threats and physical
contact1 50 affect the perceived validity of enhancing the penalty for the entire
class of physically obstructive acts. An "enough is enough" attitude pervades a
and health and activities affected interstate commerce by establishing Federal criminal
penalties and civil remedies for certain violent, threatening, obstructive and destructive
conduct that is intended to injure, intimidate or interfere with persons seeking to obtain or
provide reproductive health services" (quoting Pub. L. No. 103-259, § 2, 108 Stat. 694, 694
(1994))).
146 See Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 923 (noting that "[w]hat FACE's motive requirement
accomplishes is the perfectly constitutional task of filtering out conduct that Congress believes
need not be covered by a federal statute[, namely the] slew of random crimes that might occur
in the vicinity of an abortion clinic").
147 See S. REP. No. 103-117, at 3 (1993) ("From 1977 to April 1993, more than 1,000
acts of violence against abortion providers were reported in the United States. These acts
included at least 36 bombings, 81 arsons, 131 death threats, 84 assaults, two kidnappings, 327
clinic invasions, and one murder.").
148 See, e.g., Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 917-18 (Defendant physically assaulted a clinic
employee with an electric bullhom, physically obstructed patients from entering the clinic,
and issued threats through the bullhorn, such as "[Y]ou have not seen violence yet until you
see what we do to you." She issued over fifty such threats to a clinic doctor. She was "a well-
known advocate of the viewpoint that it is appropriate to use lethal force to prevent a doctor
from performing abortions." Citing the viewpoint and defendant's conduct, the lower court
issued a permanent injunction ordering defendant not to violate FACE, and the appellate court
upheld it.).
149 See, e.g., United States v. Sodema, 82 F.3d 1370, 1373 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting a
clinic blockade in which "defendants offered no resistance; there was no violence; there were
no threats of violence, or even displays of anger, on the part of the defendants or their
supporters, who were picketing in the vicinity").
150 See S. REP. No. 103-117, at 7 (1993) ("[Hiuman barricades often involve pushing,
shoving, destruction of equipment and other violent acts as blockaders try to keep patients and
staff from entering the clinic.").
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number of lower court opinions.' 5 ' The means of obstruction through which a
few people create an obstacle less easily removable than the many people who
may engage in the conventional sit-in seems also to influence the judicial
attitude.152 Moreover, and especially with reference to peaceful modes of
obstruction, courts cite the mixed motivation for the conduct as support for its
prohibition: Clinic blockaders often acknowledge that the primary purpose of
their conduct is to stop lawful activity, with expression as a dual, and often
secondary, objective.153
Consequently, both the broad principles that underlie the current free
speech model and the facts to which FACE most frequently applies lead to the
unbroken string of holdings that its penalty enhancements comply with the
Constitution.
b. Patterned Activity/Concerted Action Enhancement: RICO
The RICO crime is "participat[ing], directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
[an] enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity." 154 An
151 See, e.g., Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1376 ("A group cannot obtain constitutional immunity
from prosecution by violating a statute more frequently than any other group."); Dinwiddie,
76 F.3d at 924 ("[FACE] forbids physical interference with people going about their own
lawful business. It is difficult to conceive of any such statute that could not survive this level
of scrutiny.").
152 See Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1374 (describing nonviolent clinic blockading by means of
welding oneself into vehicles as "distasteful or worse" (quoting United States v. Wilson, 73
F.3d 675, 689 (7th Cir. 1995) (Coffey, J., dissenting))).
153 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-117, at 11 (1993) ("Anti-abortion activists have made it
plain that [their] conduct is part of a deliberate campaign to eliminate access [to abortion] by
closing clinics and intimidating doctors."); Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1375. The Seventh Circuit
stated in Soderna that:
The difference between communication and obstruction was well expressed by one of the
defendants in this case when he told the judge, "What we did, we weren't there to
protest abortion. If I wanted to protest abortion, I would write my Senator or my
congressman. We were there to save innocent human life.
Id. See also Paul R. Davis & William C. Davis, Civil Disobedience and Abortion
Protests: The Case for Amending C iminal Trespass Statutes 5 NoTRE DAME J.L.
ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y 995, 1010 (1991) (stating that Operation Rescue's founder
Randall Terry "indicates the short-term goal of Operation Rescue as stopping as many
abortions as a direct result of the 'rescues' as possible, and the long-term goal as being a
constitutional amendment prohibiting abortion" (citing Rescuer of the Unborn, NEW
AMEmCAN, Nov. 7, 1988, at 20)).
154 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994).
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"enterprise" can be an individual or a group. 155 A "pattern" requires "at least
two" predicate acts of racketeering activity. 156 Racketeering activity is defined
as activity that violates any one of multiple listed state and federal criminal acts,
including the Hobbs Act.157 The Hobbs Act criminalizes actual or attempted
extortion that affects interstate commerce. 158 "Extortion" is "the obtaining of
property from another" through "the wrongful use of actual or threatened
force, violence, or fear." 159 Although courts have noted that even "coercive"
speech is entitled to constitutional protection, 160 they have found illegal action,
such as trespass or destruction of property, to transform protected speech
activity into "wrongful" conduct under the Hobbs Act.161 "Property" has been
interpreted to include a broad range of intangible rights, including the right to
"make business decisions" 162 and the right "to democratic participation" in a
union. 163 In the context of abortion clinic protests in particular, "property" may
include both the right to employment at the clinics and the right to obtain
services from them.164 Patterned activity under RICO leads to criminal
penalties more severe than the individual criminal acts would warrant under
155 See id. § 1961(4).
15 6 See id. § 1961(5).
157 See id. § 1961(1)(B) (listing 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994)).
158 The Hobbs Act states that:
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement
of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or
conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property
in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1994).
159 See id. § 1951(b)(2).
160 See, e.g., Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1349 (3d
Cir. 1989) ("The mere fact, also, that the defendants or some of their protests may be
coercive or offensive, does not diminish the First Amendment right to protest.").
16 1 See McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1349 ("The jury's award of damages under RICO was
based on the destruction of the Center's medical equipment during one of the [four] incidents
of forcible entry into the Center. This award establishes that the jury found that Defendants'
actions went beyond mere dissent and publication of their political views.").
162 See United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1174 (9th Cir. 1980); Jakubik v. United
States, 585 F.2d 667, 673 (4th Cir. 1978).
163 United States v. Local 560 of Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 282 (3d Cir.
1985).
164 See National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 253 & n.2 (1994)
(noting that these were the allegations before the lower court, but not reaching the question
whether they met the Hobbs Act definitional requirements).
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state law or other federal provisions 165 or to civil liability for treble damages. 66
Like the other penalty enhancements, RICO's pattern trigger fits
comfortably as a legitimate reason for enhanced punishment within the current
free speech clause model. 167 RICO applies exclusively to conduct already
criminalized because of the nonspeech-related individual and social harms that it
produces. All of these unlawful activities, including Hobbs Act extortion,
usually have selfish ends other than communication. 168 The enhancement
depends upon repeated conduct, usually undertaken in concert with others. Like
motive, repetition and concerted action are traditional, accepted bases for
increasing the level of punishment because they are plausible proxies for
culpability and greater individual and social harm. 169
Moreover, RICO's means-based penalty enhancements, severed from the
conduct to which it applies, more easily satisfy the crucial requirement of
viewpoint neutrality than do motive-based enhancements. While motive-based
penalty enhancements tend to penalize particular beliefs when they form the
basis for action, RICO encompasses a wide variety of substantive reasons for
acting. 170 Specifically, RICO, with Hobbs Act violations as the predicate acts,
broadly penalizes patterned-purposeful, sustained, often concerted-action for
the purpose of inducing an individual to give up a wide range of rights.
Moreover, as with the other types of enhancements, the facts of most RICO
cases confirm the inference that its penalty enhancements do not usually
165 Compare the normal state law sanctions for trespass to RICO's heavy penalties.
166 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994).
167 Justice Souter, joined by Justice Kennedy, concurred in Scheidler "to stress that the
Court's opinion does not bar First Amendment challenges to RICO's application in particular
cases." Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 263. But nothing in the concurrence signaled disagreement
with Mitchell's sharp speech/conduct distinction. Rather, the concurrence restated the Mitchell
dichotomy, distinguishing RICO's appropriate application to "ideological entities whose
members commit acts of violence we need not fear chilling" from its unconstitutional
application to "entities engaging in vigorous but fully protected expression." Id. at 264.
168 RICO is part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91452, 84
Stat. 922 (codified in various sections of 18 U.S.C.). The name explains its initial target.
Congress enacted the Hobbs Act to criminalize "the use of robbery and extortion" in labor
disputes. See 91 CONG. REC. 11,900 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1945) (statement of Rep. Hancock).
A Supreme Court decision overturning union members' convictions for using threats of
violence to obtain wages without working prompted the legislation. See United States v. Local
807, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 315 U.S. 521 (1942).
169 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 932 (1982) (noting the
"special dangers ... associated with conspiratorial activity").
170 See Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 262 (rejecting the argument that the free speech clause
requires that RICO be interpreted to apply only to "predicate acts" undertaken with an
economic motive).
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significantly impact socially valuable expression. Organized crime's purpose is
to make money, not to speak. Its effect is to "drain[ ] billions of dollars from
America's economy"'171 without countervailing social value. The fact that the
activities are "patterned" increases their social harm. 172 The same is true of the
securities and general commercial fraud cases that form the bulk of civil RICO
applications. 173 The underlying acts are unlawful, which translates into socially
harmful and prohibitable. Aggregating the acts only makes them worse from a
social harm standpoint.
Finally, although several Justices have "caution[ed] courts applying RICO
to bear in mind the First Amendment interests that could be at stake," 174 their
primary concern was the possibility that "fully protected First Amendment
activity" could "amount to Hobbs Act extortion" or meet the definition of "one
of the other, somewhat elastic RICO predicate acts." 175 Although they did not
"catalog [all] the speech issues that could arise in a RICO action against a
protest group," 176 their comments presumed the current free speech clause
model. Therefore, their caveat with respect to the conduct that may qualify as a
predicate act under RICO would not appear to extend to conduct that is
unlawful because of nonspeech-related harms that it causes, such as civilly
disobedient lawbreaking.
3. Punitive Damages
The purpose of punitive damages is to punish and deter "extreme
departures from acceptable conduct." 177 They are awarded on top of
compensatory damages, often creating a windfall for the plaintiff that courts
tolerate "as a means of securing public good through a kind of quasi-criminal
punishment in the civil suit." 178 Unlike the statutory penalty enhancements that
supply explicit maximums or multipliers, punitive damages are discretionary in
amount, with the jury usually instructed to award a sum of money appropriate
171 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(84 Stat. 922) 1073, 1073.
172 See id. ("[Oirganized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified,
and widespread activity.").
173 See Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the A.B.A. Section of
Corporation, Banking and Business Law 1, 55-56 (1985) (noting that 40% of civil RICO
cases surveyed involved securities fraud and 37% involved general commercial fraud).
174 Scheier, 510 U.S. at 265 (Souter, J., and Kennedy, J., concurring).
175 Id. at 264.
176 Id. at 265.
177 DOBBS, supra note 102, § 3.11(1), at 452.
178 Id. at 457.
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to accomplish the judgment's punitive and deterrence goals.179
Punitive damages apply to a broader range of types of conduct than the
statutory penalty enhancements, which narrow the types of conduct to which
they apply according to specified characteristics. Punitive damages can apply to
almost any type of tort,180 when, in the jury's judgment, the defendant's motive
for acting was so bad as to require punishment on top of compensation for the
actual damages caused by the conduct.
There are some constitutional limits on punitive damages awards. Detailed
rules limit the chilling effect of libel awards on speech about public issues. 18 1 In
addition, grossly excessive awards for tortious speech or conduct may violate
due process,' 8 2  but, as a general matter, awards of substantial
extracompensatory damages for conduct deemed by a jury to be very bad and
thus deserving of punishment and deterrence comport with the Constitution. 183
There is no reason to believe that the current constitutional framework
would attach any special level of scrutiny to punitive damages awards for torts
179 Dobbs states that:
If the judge decides that the facts warrant submission of the case to the jury on the
punitive damages issue, the jury's discretion determines (a) whether to make the award
at all, and (b) the amount of the award, as limited by its purposes [which almost always
include (a) punishment or retribution and (b) deterrence], subject only to review as other
awards are reviewed.
Id. at 453.
180 Punitive damages do not generally apply to breach of contract actions because of the
broad common law policy judgment that entering into contracts is socially desirable conduct
that should not be deterred by the threat of a punitive award for breaching. See id. § 12.5(2),
at 452.
18 1 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (To recover any
damages, including punitive damages, a public official or public figure must prove the
allegedly libelous statement is false in fact and that the defendant acted with knowledge of or
reckless disregard as to its falsity.); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340
(1974) (To recover punitive damages where the defamation deals with an issue of public
concern, a private person must meet the New York Times standard.).
182 See BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). The jury in this case
awarded $4000 compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages to a plaintiff
because BMW did not inform him that his new car had been repainted. The Court found the
punitive award excessive in a number of respects: the egregiousness of the defendant's
conduct, the ratio of compensatory damages to punitive damages, and the criminal penalties
for the type of misconduct.
183 See Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (Punitive damages
awards do not generally violate the Constitution, but may in particular cases.).
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committed for the purpose of expression.1 84 The Oregon Supreme Court
recently rejected just such a free speech clause claim. 185 In that case, detailed
more fully in hypothetical four above, members of an environment group
boarded a private company's logging equipment, located on a government
access road, to protest federal forest preservation policies. The court relied
upon the general principles gleaned from the current free speech clause model
to uphold the jury's award of punitive damages on top of compensatory
damages for equipment damage and lost logging time. 186 "Mhe tort of trespass
to chattels is aimed at conduct not protected by... the First Amendment," 187
which, in that case, "produced a special cognizable harm (an interference with
plaintiff's possessory interest in its property), distinct from any communicative
impact."1 88
In addition to the speech/conduct distinction, the breadth of the possible
applications of the tort played a role in the court's analysis. 189 On its face, the
trespass to chattels tort does not target expression. 190 Neither are its usual
applications to expression.' 91 Thus, the government was not targeting
expression or any particular point of view in defining the tort. Moreover, as to
the jury's consideration of viewpoint, defendants were entitled to, but failed to
request, a limiting instruction. 192 Yet even with such an instruction, a properly
instructed jury "could have awarded punitive damages based on the predicate of
defendants' trespassory conduct alone [independently of any accompanying
expression of views]." 1 93 Thus, an award of punitive damages based upon "the
184 See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 918 (1982)
("[Losses proximately caused by unlawful conduct may be recovered" when such conduct is
mixed with "nonviolent, protected activity.").
185 See Huffinan & Wright Logging Co. v. Wade, 857 P.2d 101 (1993).
186 The court's primary discussion concerned the free speech guarantee of the state
constitution. See id. at 106-12.
187 See id. at 112.
188 See id. (citing Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966)).
189 Although the bulk of the court's discussion concerns state constitutional law, the
same general principles seem to apply to its federal constitutional law conclusions.
190 See Huffnam, 857 P.2d at 110 ("The content of speech is not an element of the
tort.").
191 See id. ("IT'his tort cannot readily be committed by speech, even if speech
accompanies the trespass.").
192 See id. at 111 (finding defendants' argument that the punitive damages award was
viewpoint-based "speculative," but noting that "[e]ven if defendants are correct... the
power to avoid being punished for any protected expression lay in their own hands").
193 Id. Although the court made this statement in its state law discussion, this reasoning
is implicit in the brief federal constitutional discussion, which relies upon the speech/conduct
distinction. See id. at 112 (referring to its state law conclusion in finding "the same
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character of defendants' conduct" and "defendants' motives" 194 comports with
the Constitution's free speech guarantee. 195
IT[. RELOCATING CiVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND PENALTY ENHANCEMENTS
WIrHIN THE CLARIFIED FREE SPEECH CLAUSE MODEL
A. A Claified Free Speech Clause Model
The purpose of the current free speech clause model is to effectuate the few
words of the Constitution that guarantee "freedom of speech." 196 Because
civilly disobedient lawbreaking is publicly valuable expression, it should be
analyzed differently than other illegal conduct that is functional only. A
complete free speech model should include civil disobedience's public value as
well as the harms that it necessarily causes. Several clarifications of the current
analytical model can promote an analysis of civilly disobedient lawbrealdng that
better fulfills the spirit of the "frepdom of speech" guarantee. Diagram B
identifies the locations of these clarifications within the current free speech
clause model.
conclusion" to obtain "with respect to the First Amendment").
194 Id. at 118 (Unis, J., dissenting) (quoting UNiFORM CIVIL JURY INSTmUCrION 35.01).
195 The court also incorrectly reasoned that because "the First Amendment does not
apply to private property that is not devoted to public use," there could be no constitutional
challenge to an award of punitive damages based upon a trespass to private personal property.
Id. at 112 ("[P]laintiff did not invite members of the general public to climb on or chain
themselves to its equipment or otherwise subject itself to the proscriptions of the First
Amendment."). In the political protest context, however, the free speech guarantee may
impose limits on state tort liability even when some of the protesters' activities are illegal. See
NAACP v. Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916-17 (1982) ("[Ihe presence of
activity protected by the First Amendment imposes restraints on the grounds that may give
rise to damages liability and on the persons who may be held accountable for those
damages."); see also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964). In New York
Times, the Supreme Court disposed of the argument that the plaintiff could not challenge a
state law defamation damages award because:
The Fourteenth Amendment is directed against State action and not private
action .... That proposition has no application to this case. Although this is a civil
lawsuit between private parties, the [state] courts have applied a state rule of law which
petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech
and press.
Id.
196 U.S. CONST., amend. I.
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1. The Expressive Conduct Definition
The Court's recent statement that physical assault cannot be "expressive
conduct protected by the First Amendment" 197 implies that there are per se
categories of nonexpressive conduct without explaining the criteria for the
categorization. 198 Its blanket pronouncement stems from the worry that has
plagued the Court throughout its review of expressive conduct: That, absent
some restriction, "an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled
'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to
express an idea."199 The impulse to draw a bright line is understandable-the
specter of political assassination as constitutionally protected expression is the
oft-cited example of the base of the slippery slope.200 The Court's statement,
however, conflates two categories that do not necessarily go together-
expression and constitutional protection. 201 Separating these two strands of
analysis substitutes an analytically coherent free speech model for the current
categorical definitions.
For the proposition that physical assault is not expressive conduct, the
Mitchell Court cited Roberts v. United States Jaycees, remarking on the
constitutionality of anti-discrimination legislation that "violence or other types
of potentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their
communicative impact.., are entitled to no constitutional protection," 20 2 and
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Company, noting in the context of an economic
boycott designed to coerce local merchants to respect civil rights that "[t]he
First Amendment does not protect violence." 203 Although, like the Mitchell
197 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993).
198 See id.
199 Id. (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)).
200 See WmLTAM B. LOCKHART Er AL., CONSTrrtIONAL RIGmS AND LmEPTS 692
(8th ed. 1996) (asking whether "a political assassination [would] be unprotected expression
because it is not within the scope of the first amendment or because the government interests
outweigh the expressive values"); Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CH. L.
REv. 795, 836 (1993) (noting that the result of an expressive conduct definition that looked
only to the two prongs of actor intent and audience understanding "might seem to have
extreme consequences-for example, an attempted assassination of the President may well
qualify as speech," but emphasizing that this conclusion does not mean the speech is
constitutionally protected because the government has a strong interest in protecting the
President's life).
201 See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 118, at 89-91 (distinguishing between constitutional
coverage and constitutional protection).
202 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
628 (1984)).
203 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982).
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decision, both of these opinions indicated that certain types of conduct are
outside the bounds of free speech clause protection, they did not specifically
classify the types of conduct as per se nonexpressive. Instead, in the sentence
preceding the widely quoted "special harms" statement from Roberts, the Court
explained that "acts of invidious discrimination... cause unique evils that
government has a compelling interest to prevent-wholly apart from the point
of view such conduct may transmit."204
In light of this explanation, the next sentence addressing "violence or other
types of potentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from
their communicative impact" means that "such practices are entitled to no
constitutional protection" because the government interest outweighs the social
value of what might be expressive conduct. Thus, the Mitchell Court's
statement that physical assault can never be expressive conduct is best
understood as inexact. Even the most egregiously harmful activity may be
"potentially expressive," meeting the Court's two-part test: The actor intends to
communicate and the audience is likely to understand the communication. 205
Nevertheless, some limited types of conduct will always be unprotected. 206
Rather than indicating a per se judgment as to whether physical assault is
expressive, the Mitchell Court's statement should be understood to mean that,
because of the individual and social harm inherent in the conduct, the
government's interest in preventing physical assault will always outweigh the
actor's choice of means of expression. That is, physical assault is per se
unprotected rather than per se nonexpressive. 207
Understanding the Court's statements about violence and the undefined
range of "potentially expressive activities" in this way harmonizes its conduct
analysis with its pure speech analysis. With speech, too, the Court has defined
certain limited categories, balanced them on a per se basis with the
government's interest in regulating the speech, and declared those certain types
of speech unprotected. 208 Because the "unprotected" designation means that the
government may entirely suppress such speech, 209 whether the speech is called
204 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628.
205 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974).
206 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 200, at 834 ("[The] government often does have
special and sufficiently neutral justification for regulating conduct.").
207 See, e.g., id. at 835 ("The key to the distinction [between speech and conduct], often
thought to lie in the determination of whether the conduct qualifies for initial protection,
actually lies in the fact that government often has good reasons for regulating it.").
208 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) ("These areas of speech
can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally
proscribable content.").
209 The government may entirely suppress the speech based upon the content element
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"unprotected" or not speech at all may appear inconsequential. Instead, the
initial designation of the activity as "speech" is analytically crucial. By
recognizing that the activity within the unprotected category has the outward
characteristics of speech, the Court necessarily makes the definition of the
unprotected category dependent upon the balance between the activity's
expressive value and the government's interest in suppressing it.210 The point at
which this no longer balances on a per se basis marks the outer limit of the
unprotected category. 211
This characterization of the Mitchell Court's reference to physical assault as
striking the same balance with respect to conduct as it has with respect to
certain speech categories is important because it means that the per se
categories of unprotected conduct must have a limit, too, where the balance
between an act's expressive value and resulting harms no longer obtains.
Specifically, the Court's potentially broad statements as to the unprotected
nature of "violence" and "physical assault" do not necessarily apply to all acts
of lawbreaking. Rather, as illegal acts become less violent and less personally
directed, the balance between expressive value and social harm may come out
differently according to the circumstances of particular actions. Diagram C
illustrates this first clarification of the current free speech clause model.
that defines it (obscenity, defamation), but any further content discrimination within the class
of unprotected speech, unless it falls within an articulated exception, will invoke strict scrutiny
review. See id.
210 See id. at 386 ("Mhe exclusion of 'fighting words' from the scope of the First
Amendment simply means that, for purposes of that Amendment, the unprotected features of
the words are, despite their verbal character, essentially a 'nonspeech' element of
communication.").
211 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (requiring, for a communication to
be obscene, that "the average person, applying contemporary community standards would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest"; that the "work depict[ I
or describe[ ], in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically described" by state
law; and that "the work, taken as a whole, lack[ ] serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value"); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524 (1972) (paraphrasing Chapinsky
fighting words test to require that the words "have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence
by the person to whom individually, the remark is addressed"); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (requiring for constitutionally unprotected incitement that "such
advocacy [be] directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and [be] likely to
incite or produce such action"); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)
(defining libel as a false statement of fact and imposing other proof requirements to avoid
chilling politically valuable speech).
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Diagram C
Clarification # 1
\
conductI
intent to communicate?
reasonably understandable?
7 >
YES NO/
expressive nonexpressiveI
no personally
directed violence
/ I
YES NOI
per se
unprotected
2. The Same Multi-Factor Balancing Test Applies to Expressive Conduct
as to Content-Neutral Speech Regulations
According to the Court, there is "little, if any, differen[ce]" between the
test it applies to expressive conduct and the one it applies to content-neutral
speech regulations. 212 This should be a reality that renders some government
rules that suppress expressive conduct unconstitutional because of their
expressive impact, regardless of the government's motivation. 213
On the speech side, the Court's analytical model reflects the recognition
that government actions may violate the free speech guarantee even if the
212 Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 & n.8 (1984).
213 See Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34
STAN. L. REV. 113, 130 (1981) ("[C]ontent-neutml restrictions may significantly undermine
the value of free expression by imposing limitations on the opportunity for individual
expression.").
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government's target is not the communication aspect of the regulated
activity. 214 An important part of the analysis is determining the weight of the
government interest, not just the fact that it has some substance. 215 Whether
alternate means for the government to serve its interest exist is another
important consideration,2 16 with the Court sometimes looking to whether the
expression-restrictive government action is significantly underinclusive of other
obvious contributors to the problem it is addressing. 217 The impact on
expression is an important consideration, both absolutely218 and as to the types
of speakers affected. 219 Whether alternate, similarly effective means are
214 The designation "content-neutral" means that the government has adopted a
regulation of speech "without reference to the content of the regulated speech." Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (reviewing noise regulations (quoting Comnuunity
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 293)).
215 See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 53 (1994) ("Ladue's sign ordinance
is supported principally by the City's interest in minimizin the visual clutter associated with
signs, an interest that is concededly valid but certainly no more compelling than the" City's
interest in maintaining a stable, racially integrated neighborhood, which was not sufficient to
support a prohibition of residential 'For Sale' signs in Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Willingboro,
431 U.S. 85 (1977)).
216 See, e.g., City of Ladue, 512 U.S. at 58-59 ("We are confident that more temperate
measures could in large part satisfy Iadue's stated regulatory needs without harm to the First
Amendment rights of its citizens.").
217 See, e.g., id. at 51 ("While surprising at first glance, the notion that a regulation of
speech may be impermissibly underinclusive is firmly grounded in basic First Amendment
principles."); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (requiring, to
justify its billboard ban, that San Diego demonstrate a comprehensive coordinated effort in its
commercial and industrial areas to address other obvious contributors to an unattractive
environment).
218 See, e.g., City of Ladue, 512 U.S. at 55 ("Although prohibitions foreclosing entire
media may be completely free of content or viewpoint discrimination, the danger they pose to
the freedom of speech is readily apparent-by eliminating a common means of speaking, such
measures can suppress too much speech.").
219 See, e.g., id. at 57 ("Residential signs are an unusually cheap and convenient form
of communication. Especially for persons of modest means or limited mobility, a yard or
window sign may have no practical substitute."); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 812-13 n.30 (1984) (noting that "the Court has shown special solicitude for forms
of expression that are much less expensive than feasible alternatives and hence may be
important to a large segment of the citizenry," but that "this solicitude has practical
boundaries"); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) ("Door to door
distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people."); see also
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 102 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting). Black stated that:
Laws which hamper the free use of some instruments of communication thereby favor
competing chanels .... There are many people who have ideas that they wish to
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available to the speaker to communicate is a crucial consideration. 220 The result
is a true balance of social values-the public interest in robust and uninhibited
political dialogue against the generally shared interest in having the majority
government efficiently accomplish its nonspeech-related goals.
Why is the purportedly identical balancing of expressive conduct
restrictions less even-handed in practice? The answer appears to be that with
conduct the Court has implicitly resolved some of the considerations on a per se
basis in the government's favor. The assumption seems to be that an adequate
speech alternative exists to expressive conduct.221 Thus, the overall effect of the
governmental action on public dialogue is de minimis.222 But the Court's own
observations belie this assumption. 223 Also, because conduct restrictions are not
aimed at normal means of communication, 224 there may appear to be little
danger of a disproportionate impact upon speakers with certain points of view.
Yet, in those instances where lawbreaking is, in fact, a means of
communication, the expression-related effect of enforcing the law will fall
disproportionately upon those who oppose government action.225
None of these particular considerations dictate a result. However, all of
disseminate but who do not have enough money to own or control publishing plants,
newspapers, radios, moving picture studios, or chains of show places.
Id.
220 See, e.g., City of Ladue, 512 U.S. at 54 (noting that the City, by banning residential
signs, had "almost completely foreclosed a venerable means of communication that is both
unique and important").
221 See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)
(noting that the National Park Service ban on overnight sleeping could not be faulted "on the
ground that without overnight sleeping the plight of the homeless could not be communicated
in other ways").
222 See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 571 (1991) ("ITMhe
requirement that the dancers don pasties and a G-string does not deprive the dance of
whatever erotic message it conveys; it simply makes the message slightly less graphic.").
223 See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974) (Flags "are a form of
symbolism comprising a 'primitive but effective way of communicating ideas'" and may
represent "a short cut from mind to mind." (quoting Board of Eluc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 632 (1943))).
224 Compare United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (referring to the
"alleged communicative element in [the draft card burning] conduct") with City of Ladue, 512
U.S. at 56 ("[W]e are not persuaded that adequate substitutes exist for the important medium
of speech that Ladue has closed off.") (emphasis added).
225 See, e.g., Geoffrey S. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 189, 221-22 (1983) ("As applied to expression, the [anti-draft card burning
statute in O'Brien] had an obvious disparate impact on those who opposed government policy,
for who would destroy a draft card as an expression of support for government policy?").
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them should enter into a determination of whether a particular government
action comports with the free speech guarantee because they may vary
according to the specific expressive conduct at issue. That is, none of them
should be removed from the analysis just because the impacted activity is
conduct rather than verbal expression. Diagram D portrays this second
clarification.
Diagram D
mid-level mid-level
balancing balancing
govt. purpose
alt. govt. means
speech impact
alt. speaker means
disprop. impact
place/tradition
outcome depends on
fact-specific balancing
minimum economic due process
rational basis scrutiny
- legit purpose
- means reasonably tailored
govt. action almost
always is valid
Clarification # 2
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3. The Overriding Prohibition on Government Viewpoint Discrimination
The core free speech principle is that the government may not "proscrib[e]
speech... because of disapproval of the ideas expressed." 226 But what of
conduct? If conduct is expressive, then a crucial part of the analysis asks
whether the government action is message-directed. 227 If so, the conduct
effectively becomes speech, and the government must justify its restriction
under the strict scrutiny standard.228 If conduct is nonexpressive, its treatment
under the current model is less clear. Some of the Court's statements imply that
once conduct is deemed nonexpressive, free speech analysis is over.229
The better view, however, is that the rule against government viewpoint
discrimination cuts across all government actions, from those that impact pure
speech to those that impact nonexpressive conduct.2 30 In any situation where a
government action distinguishes on the basis of viewpoint the "specter" exists
"that the government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the
marketplace." 231 Thus, strict scrutiny review must apply any time that a
government regulation of anything targets a particular point of view.
According to established precedent, although this broad rule against
viewpoint discrimination requires a court to look for an intent discernable on
the face of the government action,232 the philosophy behind the rule is not so
226 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
227 See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 367, 377-78.
2 28 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
229 See Brownstein, supra note 132, at 631 ("[Olne might imply [sic] that viewpoint-
discriminatory regulations of conduct are constitutional from the Court's emphasis in Mitchell
on the fact that the hate crimes statute only regulated conduct as the basis for distinguishing
Mitchell from R.A. V. ").
230 See, e.g., id. at 629-30. Brownstein stated that:
[1It is entirely irrelevant that [a] viewpoint-discriminatory regulation of unprotected
speech is directly restricting speech, and not conduct .... [Law] that allows
Republicans to physically assault Democrats but punishes Democrats for physically
retaliating against their assailants is probably even more violative of First Amendment
principles than a law allowing Republicans, but not Democrats, to use fighting words in
public debates.
Id. See also Weinstein, supra note 112, at 361 ("Although no Supreme Court case is precisely
on point, this [principle that government may not constitutionally enact laws that, by their
terms, favor or disfavor any political ideology] should extend even to regulation of criminal
activity that is neither speech nor expressive conduct.").
231 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1991).
232 See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 763 (1994) (In
determining whether a government action is viewpoint-based, "the government's purpose [is]
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limited. 233 As the Court has recognized when looking with care at content-
neutral speech restrictions and even more specifically at the rule's
disproportionate impact on particular types of speakers, a government motive to
suppress speech is not the only evil that the free speech clause addresses.234 To
fully guarantee that minority points of view remain part of the political
dialogue, the Constitution must protect expression from unconscious as well as
purposeful silencing. Thus, the general rule against government viewpoint
discrimination suggests that some level of scrutiny beyond the extraordinarily
deferential rational basis should be triggered when any government action has
the effect of disproportionately silencing expression of a particular point of
view.235 Specifically, this disproportionate viewpoint impact of a government
action should be one of the factors in the constitutional balance whether a
government regulation impacts expression through the means of speech or
conduct.
Diagram E portrays this last clarification of the current free speech clause
model. Diagrams F and G, first with the clarification locations identified, then
without such identifications, portray the fully clarified free speech clause model
that should guide analysis of penalty enhancements applied to civil
disobedience.
Diagram E
Clarification # 3
govt. action
allegedly restricts individual expressionI
govt. targets a viewpoint?
strict _ N
scrutiny YES NOI
is the individual action expression?
the threshold consideration.").
233 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 75, at 676-94 (demonstrating that viewpoint
discriminatory impact is of concern under a number of free speech theories).
234 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 225, at 189-90 (arguing that more than a government
motive to suppress speech underpins the content-based/content-neutral speech distinction).
235 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 75, at 706-07 (arguing that the standard of review in
symbolic speech cases should rise to the level of strict scrutiny).
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B. Civil Disobedience's Place in the Clarified Free Speech Clause
Model
Civil disobedience, as intentional lawbreaking engaged in for the purpose
of expression and under circumstances where it is likely to be understood, 23
6
must be viewed as expressive conduct. Yet civil disobedience is importantly
distinct both from the broad class of lawbreaking and the broad class of
expressive conduct, thus requiring a free speech analysis all its own.
The usual lawbreaking is where one individual asserts his will against the
will of the majority (embodied in the law) for selfish purposes, accompanied by
an effort to avoid detection and punishment. The act is functional, rather than
expressive, 237 and the act evidences contempt for the democratic principle of
majority rule. The civil disobedient also asserts his will against the will of the
majority, but in a different way and for a different purpose. Civil disobedience
is a public act.238 The purpose is to convey a political message from the
minority to the majority. 239 The civil disobedient's willingness to accept the
punishment demonstrates a respect for the general principle of the rule of law at
236 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 415 (1974) (establishing this two-part
test).
237 See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294-95 (1983)
(separating sleeping as functional from sleeping as expressive).
238 See, e.g., CARL COHEN, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: CoNscIENcE, TAcncs, AND THE
LAw 39 ("Civil disobedience is an act of protest... publicly performed."); RAwLs, supra
note 11, at 366 ("[C]ivil disobedience is a public act."); Frank M. Johnson, Civil
Disobedience and the Law, 44 TUL. L. REv. 1, 6 (1969) (stating that civil disobedience is "an
open, intentional violation of law"); Keeton, supra note 98, at 508 ("[The] act of civil
disobedience [is] ... an act of deliberate and open violation of law."); Martha Minow,
Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients Struggle for Social Change, 52 U. Prrr. L. Ray.
723, 733 n.38 (1991) ("'Civil disobedience' is... undertaken in a public way....");
Sanford J. Rosen, Civil Disobedience and Other Such Technicalities: Law Making Through
Law Breaking, 37 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 435, 442 (1969) ("Civil Disobedience... may be
defined as open."); van den Haag, supra note 94, at 27 ("[C]ivil disobedience [occurs] when
a law is deliberately disobeyed to publicly demonstrate opposition... to laws or policies of
the government."). But see MkcHAEL J. PERRY, MoR rY, Poumcs AND LAw 118 (1988)
("The position that disobedience must be open or public to be legitimate is also untenable.")
(footnote omitted).
239 See, e.g., RAwLs, supra note 11, at 366 ("One may compare [civil disobedience] to
public speech, and being a form of address, an expression of profound and conscientious
political conviction."); Bruce Ledewitz, Civil Disobedience, Injunctions, and the First
Amendment, 19 HoFsmaA L. REv. 67, 122-23 ("[Civil disobedience] illustrates depth of
commitment by the minority-a factor the majority should wish to consider in setting policy.
[Civil disobedience] grabs the attention of the majority, thus promoting debate and lessening
public apathy.").
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the same time that the act communicates dissent from the law's particular
provisions.24o All of these factors combined transform a presumptively socially
harmful criminal act into socially valuable expressive conduct that, unlike most
other acts of lawbreaking, should trigger free speech clause analysis.241
The fact, however, that civil disobedience's social value is inextricably
entwined with lawbreaking distinguishes it as a subset of the broader class of all
expressive conduct. Whereas conduct that does not depend upon lawbreaking to
convey its message can, at least in theory, be immune from punishment,2 42
such punishment is part of civil disobedience's definition.243 Thus, under the
clarified free speech clause model, the base act of civil disobedience is covered.
That is, it qualifies as expressive conduct and thus is subject to the multi-factor
balancing test. Yet the result of this balancing in any particular case of civil
disobedience will be that it is ultimately unprotected. This result stems from the
general commitment to orderly democratic government that undergirds all
constitutional models. While the Constitution guarantees certain individual
rights, its underlying democratic philosophy is that relevant majorities can
legitimately make laws and enforce them against dissenters. 244 Recognizing
240 See RAWLS, supra note 11, at 366. Rawls stated that:
[Civil disobedience] expresses disobedience to law within the limits of fidelity to law,
although it is at the outer edge thereof. The law is broken, but fidelity to law is
expressed by the public and nonviolent nature of the act, by the willingness to accept the
legal consequences of one's actions.
Id. (footnote omitted).
241 See, e.g., Ledewitz, supra note 6, at 571 (condemning the "binary thinking of
legal/illegal" as "ridiculous in the context of political protest," but noting that "it is difficult
for judges" to see value in law-violation).
242 The crux of the expressive conduct claim is that a regulation, valid as applied to
purely functional conduct, may not constitutionally be applied to restrict expression. Where
lawbreaking is not a crucial part of the expression, lifting the punishment in a particular
instance is an accommodation and, when recognized as a limited exception based upon
important competing interests, preserves the principle of the rule of law. Thus, for example,
had the Community for Creative Non-Violence protesters been permitted to remain during the
night in the government park, their message, communicated through sleeping without a
permanent shelter, would have remained, and the government would have retained the ability
to enforce the anti-sleeping regulation against others who did not have as substantial an
expressive purpose or none at all. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 295 (1983) (Initial erection of the tent cities was with the permission of the Park
Service, so breaking the law was not part of the message.).
243 See, e.g., Ledewitz, supra note 6, at 571 ("[B]y far the greatest difficulty in
protecting the sit-in is simply that the sit-in is, and must remain, illegal.").
244 See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965) ("The constitutional
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lawbreaking as a protected form of expression could lead to anarchy as
everyone disobeyed laws with which they disagreed and then sought
constitutional protection for their lawless actions. 245 The general presumption of
the rule of law is that the proper form of protest against particular government
actions is through lawful speech and action designed to change it.246 Thus,
whatever the expressive value of the act of intentional lawbrealdng-and it may
be substantial-the government interests both in vindicating the private interests
affected 247 and, more importantly, in protecting the general societal interest in
maintaining the rule of law will always outweigh it.248
guarantee of liberty implies the existence of an organized society maintaining public order,
without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of anarchy."); RAWLS, supra note
11, at 363 ("[The question of when civil disobedience is justified] involves the nature and
limits of majority rle.").
245 See United States v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336, 339 (D. Md. 1968). This district
court stated that:
No civilized nation can endure where a citizen can select what law he would obey
because of his moral or religious belief. It matters not how worthy his motives may be.
It is axiomatic that chaos would exist if an individual were permitted to impose his
beliefs upon others and invoke justification in a court to excuse his transgression of a
duly-enacted law.
Id.
246 See, e.g., Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966) ("[P]eople who want to
propagandize protest or views [do not] have a constitutional right to do so whenever and
however and wherever they please."); Michigan AFL-CIO v. Michigan Employment
Relations Comm'n, 538 N.W.2d 433, 492 (Mich. App. 1995) ("[A]ny citizen[ ] who wishes
to protest may do so by lawful means, such as informational picketing, passing out leaflets, or
addressing the school board during a public comment period.").
247 See, e.g., Adderly, 385 U.S. at 47. The Supreme Court stated that:
Nothing in the Constitution of the United States prevents Florida from even-handed
enforcement of its general trespass statute [against those who break it as a form of
political protest] .... The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to
preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.
Id.
248 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Berrigan, 472 A.2d 1099, 1126 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
From the earliest times when man chose to guide his relations with fellow men by
allegiance to the rule of law rather than force, he has been faced with the problem how
best to deal with the individual in society who through moral conviction concluded that a
law with which he was confronted was unjust and therefore must not be
followed.... However, [thinkers throughout the ages] have been in general agreement
that while in restricted circumstances a morally motivated act contrary to law may be
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Nor does the disproportionate impact of enforcing the law against civil
disobedients lead to a different constitutional conclusion. If this impact alone
were enough to invalidate such enforcement, the rule of law would be
undermined as everyone could become laws unto themselves rather than being
bound by the principle of majority rule. 249 Where a particular type of conduct
warrants punishment solely for the individual and social harms caused by its
functional aspects, across-the-board application of the punishment to include
those with an expressive purpose is appropriate. 250 In this constitutional
democracy, everyone presumptively has the ability to participate in forming the
law ultimately adopted by the majority, including the penalty provisions which
generally apply to all lawbreakers who cause a particular type of harm. When
dissatisfied minority members resort to lawbreaking to express their
disagreement with majority action, they should justly pay the price that the
majority has determined appropriate for the individual and social harms caused
by the functional components that their acts share with all others who engage in
the same class of unlawful conduct. 251 This crucial role of punishment to the
social value of the civil disobedience thus distinguishes it as a subset within the
broad category of expressive conduct.
Yet it is also critical to clarify exactly what type of penalty affects this
distinction within the expressive conduct category. This is the normal penalty
applied to the functional component of the acts within the broad class of
lawbreaking. Specifically, when a protester chooses to break the law, she must
accept the punishment the majority has deemed appropriate for the individual
ethically .justified, the action must be non-violent and the actor must accept the penalty
for his action.
Id. (quoting United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1008-09 (4th Cir. 1969)).
249 See, e.g., Non-resident Taxpayers Ass'n v. Philadelphia, 341 F. Supp. 1139, 1145
(D.N.J. 1971). The district court stated that:
[The conclusion that plaintiff's interest in communicating his disagreement with the tax
laws by failing to pay them outweighs the government's interest in uniform collection]
would tend to countenance almost any variety of "symbolic speech" as being within the
protection of the First Amendment and would foster civil disobedience. Surely, the First
Amendment cannot be judicially expanded to support such a construction.
Id. at 1146.
250 See, e.g., Adderly, 385 U.S. at 47 ("Nothing in the Constitution of the United States
prevents Florida from even-handed enforcement of its general trespass statute against
[political protesters].").
251 See, e.g., Michigan AFL-CIO, 538 N.W.2d at 493 ("A citizen may ... choose to
protest by violating the law, e.g., by staging a sit-in or other form of trespass protest. When
citizens do so, they must face the consequences of their actions .... ").
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and social harms caused by the functional components of her action. Once she
does so, however, she has begun the political dialogue, offering her sacrifice as
proof of her sincerity and the depth of her convictions.25 2 Accepting the base
penalty for her action lends social value to her communication, distinguishing
her lawbreaking from the broad class that includes all illegal actions for
purposes of further free speech clause analysis. It is this further analysis that
must occur when the government identifies certain functional acts as qualifying
for enhanced punishment because of some characteristic that may correlate to
the civil disobedient's expressive purpose.
C. Penalty Enhancement's Place in the Clarified Free Speech Clause
Model
Analysis of the Mitchell Court's reasoning in light of the clarified free
speech clause model reveals the constitutional limits of penalty enhancements.
To recapitulate, the Mitchell Court addressed the defendant's claim of
unconstitutional action in several ways. First, it noted that motive may
legitimately define unlawful conduct and determine the severity of
punishment.253 Second, it stated that the enhancement statute was "aimed at
conduct unprotected by the First Amendment" rather than expression. 254 Third,
it noted that "special harms" stemming from the motive-based crimes warranted
enhaficed punishment. 255 Only the third has independent weight under the
clarified free speech clause model.
The first, the traditional consideration of motive in defining and punishing
offenses, only makes sense when the motive is defined as a bad thing. 256 Under
any free speech clause model, it cannot be "bad" merely as a disfavored
belief.257 It has to be bad for a nonspeech-related reason-specifically a reason
that connects the belief with socially harmful conduct. 258 Thus, the first
252 See, e.g., RAwLs, supra note 11, at 367 ("We must pay a certain price to convince
others that our actions have, in our carefully considered view, a sufficient moral basis in the
political convictions of the community.").
253 See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1993).
254 Id. at 487.
255 Id. at484.
256 See id. at 485 (noting that a "bad" as opposed to a "good" motive is a legitimate
sentencing consideration) (citing 1 W. LEFAvE & A. ScoTr, SuBsrANTnvE CRIMNAL LAw
§ 3.6(b), at 324 (1986)).
257 Id. at 468 ("[A] defendant's abstract beliefs, however obnoxious to most people,
may not be taken into consideration by a sentencing judge.").
258 Id. (noting that where defendant's racial animus was "related" to the crime, it could
be considered in sentencing).
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justification is essentially the same as the third, which looks to the nonspeech-
related harms that result from the motive.
The second relies on a speech/conduct distinction that tips the scales
dramatically in favor of a law's validity where it aims at nonspeech-related
consequences of conduct.259 Under the revised model, which requires some
serious level of consideration of the expressive impact of government action
regardless of the government's purpose, the speech/conduct distinction would
not be dispositive. Rather, where the conduct suppressed by the government
action is expressive, the same balancing test would apply as to speech activities.
The significance of the speech/conduct distinction in this instance would be only
to signal that, because the government action is directed at conduct, it is less
likely to substantially impact expression in the broad range of cases to which it
may apply than a government action directed at a usual means of
communication. In the smaller range of applications where the lawbreaking
conduct is expressive, however, the signal is misleading. 260 Despite the
presumption gleaned from the broad class of cases, in this particular instance
the government action substantially affects expression.
It is the third reason-that the triggering characteristic plus the underlying
conduct result in "special harms"-that must ground the constitutional analysis.
The existence of these special harms justifies the government action in two
distinct ways. First, separate, nonspeech-related harms give proof of a
legitimate, nonspeech-related government motive.261 Second, the "unique
evils" attest to a different balance between the government interest and the
potentially expressive conduct than occurred with the base penalty.262 That is,
the existence of special harms flowing from the subset of conduct that warrants
the enhancement indicates that the characteristic that triggers the enhancement
changes the underlying conduct in a way that tips the constitutional balance in
favor of the government's interest.263 Thus, as with application of the base
25 9 See supra text accompanying notes 72-75 (explaining that the expressive conduct
balancing test equates to minimal rational basis scrutiny in application).
260 (). Williams, supra note 75, at 706-07 (arguing that, because of a greater expressive
impact, in the narrow range of cases where symbolic conduct is at issue a stricter standard of
review should apply than in instances where the government action restricts usual means of
expression).
261 See Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 488 ("The State's desire to redress these perceived harms
provides an adequate explanation for its penalty-enhancement provision over and above mere
disagreement with offenders' beliefs or biases.").
262 See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 629-30 ("In prohibiting [acts of
invidious discrimination], the Minnesota [Human Rights] Act therefore responds precisely to
the substantive problem which legitimately concerns the State .... ." (quoting City Council of
Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 810 (1984))).
263 See Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 488 ("[it is but reasonable that among crimes of different
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penalty for the functional components of the broad class of conduct, it is a
balance between the government interest in enhancing the penalty and the
expressive value of the underlying conduct-the act plus the distinguishing
characteristics-that must justify the enhancement.
IV. APPLYING PENALTY ENHANCEMENTS TO CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
UNDER THE CLARIFIED FREE SPEECH CLAUSE MODEL
Within both the current and the clarified free speech clause model, the
breadth of a penalty enhancement may be important proof of its
constitutionality. Specifically, application of a penalty enhancement to motives
that may encompass a range of viewpoints on a political topic may shield it
from the strict scrutiny that should apply if the government targets a particular
point of view.2 64 This breadth of coverage carries its own danger, which is
overinclusion. 265 Although a conduct-directed law may be valid in the bulk of
its applications, it may be invalid in the more unusual instance where its
application restricts constitutionally protected expression. 266 Because acts of
civil disobedience constitute a segregable subset of acts that differs in a
constitutionally significant way from the broad class of acts to which a penalty
enhancement provision may apply, such acts must be isolated and separately
analyzed to determine whether imposition of the enhancement comports with
the free speech clause guarantee.
natures those should be most severely punished, which are the most destructive of the public
safety and happiness." (quoting Wnu1AM BLACKSTONE, CoMnmrEs ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 16 (1962))).
264 See, e.g., United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 923 (8th Cir. 1996) (Because
"FACE would prohibit striking employees from obstructing access to a clinic in order to stop
women from getting abortions, even if the workers were carrying signs that said, 'We are
underpaid!' rather than 'Abortion is wrong!'" it "is content neutral and, therefore, need not
survive strict scrutiny.").
265 Where protected expression comprises a significant portion of a law's target, it may
be fheially overbroad and therefore unenforceable in any application. See, e.g., Board of
Airport Corm'n of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 575-77 (1987)
(invalidating rule that proscribed all "First Amendment activities" in airport terminal).
266 See TRMBE, supra note 54, at 1022 ("[A]lmost every law, such as [an] ordinary
trespass ordinance .... is potentially applicable to constitutionally protected acts; that danger
does not invalidate the law as such but merely invalidates its enforcement against protected
activity.").
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A. Factors in the Constitutional Balance Presumptively Protect Civil
Disobedience from Penalty Enhancement
1. Civil Disobedience's Social Value
The social value of the expression lost when an ostensibly conduct-directed
government action silences civilly disobedient expression must be a distinct
factor in the balance that determines the action's validity. Civil disobedience is
a part of a respectful public dialogue2 67 about an intrinsically political topic-
the majority's decision as to what should be the specific content of its law. The
expression is about justice, fairness, political participation-issues in the
stratosphere of the free speech hierarchy.268 Moreover, it is political protest
that, in its lawful manifestations, occupies a central place in the free speech
clause's range of protection.269
That civil disobedience involves lawbreaking does not divest it of all
positive social value. The political expression remains, often augmented by the
publicity that the lawbreaking creates.270 From before the American
267 See, e.g., inda Stewart Ball, NAACP Chief Trains People in Civil Disobedience,
DALLAs MORNING Nws, Mar. 16, 1997, at 40A (quoting a county commissioner who
engaged in civil disobedience to say that "civil disobedience training is needed to educate
residents about the protestors' goals").
268 See, e.g., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 483 (1988) ("Political
speech, we have often noted, is at the core of the First Amendment."); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 45 (1976) (characterizing campaign contribution and expenditure limits as impacting
"core First Amendment rights of political expression"); Schultz v. Frisby, 807 F.2d 1339,
1344 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[l]ssues of public concern occup[y] the 'highest rung of the hierarchy
of First Amendment values.'" (quoting, inter alia, Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467
(1980))).
269 See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (stating that prohibition of
protest signs within 500 foot radius of an embassy "operates at the core of the First
Amendment by prohibiting petitioners from engaging in classically political speech");
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913-14 (1982) ("While States have
broad power to regulate economic activity, we do not find a comparable right to prohibit
peaceful political activity such as that found in the [protest] boycott in this case."); Christina
E. Wells, Abortion Counseling as Vice Activity: The Free Speech Implications of Rust v.
Sullivan and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1724, 1763 (1995) ("Protests
of any kind raise classic free speech issues."); see also Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S.
229, 235 (1963) (characterizing a protest gathering that constituted a trespass onto state
government property as "an exercise of... basic constitutional rights in their most
pristine... form"); SHffmw, supra note 72, at 79 ("IT]he protection of dissent and its
nurturance is a major American value.").
270 See, e.g., Albert Eisele, The Scylla and Charybdis of Welfare Refonn, THE HILL,
Dec. 13, 1995, at 26 (contrasting "[s]everal sharply different, and perhaps equally valid,
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Revolution271  through anti-slavery activities,272  the women's suffrage
movement,273 civil rights2 74 and anti-war activism,275 up to the current
environmental, 276 animal rights,277 gay rights,278 and abortion-related
protests,279 to name a few,280 civil disobedience has contributed to the
approaches to the debate over how to clean out the Augean stables of the nation's muddled
welfare system" that occurred "on the same day last week": "One was a highly visible and
dramatic act of civil disobedience that took place in the Capitol Rotunda" that "received the
most media attention," while the "other was a little-noticed and thoughtful exchange of
viewpoints by two luncheon speakers at the Georgetown University Conference Center");
Harie, supra note 2, at A9 (describing House gallery protest by women opposed to
legislature's treatment of low-income Utahns, after which a representative "scrambled
upstairs to question [a television reporter] about whether he knew of the demonstration in
advance and to attempt to dissuade him from airing a tape of the demonstration: "There's the
potential when television cameras cover that of encouraging other groups," the representative
said).
27 1 See CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN AMERICA 20 (David R. Weber ed., 1978) (chronicling
the origin and history of American civil disobedience).
272 See, e.g., ROBERT M. COVER, JusnCE ACCuSED: ANImsLAvERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 175-91 (1975) (detailing the activities of abolitionists and the judicial response);
Matthew Lippman, Liberating the Law: The Jurisprudence of Civil Disobedience and
Resistance, 2 SAN DIEGO Jusr. J. 299, 317-28 (1994) (same).
273 Perhaps the most famous such incident was the prosecution of Susan B. Anthony for
illegal voting. See CIVIL DSOBEDIENCE N AMmUcA, supra note 271, at 184-85.
274 See, e.g., Videotape: Eye on the Prize Video Series (Judith Vecchione 1987) (PBS
Home Video) (chronicling civil rights movement civil disobedience such as lunch counter sit-
ins and freedom rides).
275 See generally STVEN E. BARKAN, PROTESTORS ON TrIAL (1985) (chronicling
history of anti-war movement, including acts of civil disobedience).
276 See, e.g., Martinez, supra note 2, at B1. Martinez describes an environmental
activist training camp where students can "take their activism beyond letter-writing
campaigns... to 'direct action'[:] Pioneered by Greenpeace in the '80's, such pro-
environmental efforts include boarding ships accused of using illegal fishing nets, occupying
trees slated for logging and, most frequently, hanging huge banners from buildings." Id.
277 See, e.g., JAMES M. JASpER & DOROTHY NM IN, THE ANIMAL RIGHTS CRUSADE
(1992).
278 See, e.g., Levy, supra note 2, at Al (chronicling ten-year history of ACT-UP's
"audacious media events").
279 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-117, at 12 (1993) (chronicling the activities of anti-
abortion protesters, including civil disobedience); SUZANNE STAGGENBORG, THE PRO-CHOICE
MOvEME (1991) (chronicling the activities of the pro-choice movement, including civil
disobedience).
280 The news burgeons with accounts of recent acts of civil disobedience on a wide
range of topics. See, e.g., BALnV oI SuN, Jan. 11, 1996, at 2A ("More than 130 people
were arrested at Yale University yesterday for blocking a street in a show of civil
disobedience over the university's treatment of graduate students."); Disabled Demonstrate
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American political dialogue. Although it is lawbreaking, civil disobedience
enjoys a level of public acceptance that distinguishes it from ordinary illegal
actions. 281
To be sure, that the means of communication is lawbreaking means that it
likely results in individual and social harms not present when the expression is
lawful. 282 Certainly these harms must be part of the constitutional balance that
determines whether the government may enforce the law. However, they must
be isolated and placed where they belong in the analysis-under consideration
of the nature and weight of the government's interest. They are part of the
balance, but not alone determinative. The social value of the lawbreaking
expression must have a distinct, strong weight in the constitutional balance.
2. The Importance of the Means of Communication
That content-directed government actions may silence civilly disobedient
expression might not be troublesome if, as seems often to be the assumption,
means of communication other than lawbreaking are available and equally
effective.283 Lawbrealdng, however, is a unique mode of communication. 284 It
for Home Care, UPI, Oct. 23, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI file ("Some 400
activists for the disabled are [engaging in nonviolent civil disobedience] in Lansing Monday in
support of home-based care alternatives."); Inside Politics (Cable News Network, July 20,
1995) (describing civil disobedience and arrests protesting the University of California's
proposed abandonment of race as a consideration in admissions).
281 See RONALD DwOpKmI, A MATrna OF PRiNCiPLE 105 (1985) ("Americans accept
that civil disobedience has a legitimate if informal place in the political culture of their
community."); Eisele, supra note 270, at 26 (describing an act of civil disobedience to protest
welfare cuts as "valid": "I was struck by the protesters' courage, conviction and evident
compassion for the poor"); Ledewitz,.supra note 239, at 105 ("[C]ivil disobedience... has
become an established part of American political life."); Miller, supra note 17, at A4 (noting
that anti-nuclear protest organizers "have been meeting with [the police chief] about the
[planned] acts of civil disobedience").
2 82 Yet even when protest speech is lawful, it may cause substantial individual and social
harms. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 774 (1994) (striking down
prohibition on all uninvited approaches by anti-abortion protesters of women seeking
abortions: "'As a general matter, we have indicated that in public debate our own citizens
must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing
space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment'" (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S.
312, 322 (1988))).
283 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 54, at 983 (arguing that the draft card-burner O'Brien
"[m]ade no showing that alternative, equally effective, ways of expressing his message were
unavailable. He could, after all have burned a copy of his draft card in front of the very same
audience as a means of making the very same point").
284 See, e.g., Ely, supra note 3, at 1489-90 ("[Mluch of the effectiveness of O'Brien's
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grabs the majority attention in a way that lawful means may not,285 signifying
not only a distinct substantive message,286 but also signaling the protester's
depth of commitment in an induplicable way.287 A lone African American
woman refusing to move to the back of a segregated bus conveys a different
message than if she were to circle the bus stop with a picket sign or distribute
handwritten circulars to advertise her protest.2 88 The same conclusion, we must
acknowledge, holds true for the comparison between the act of bombing the
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City as opposed to writing a
letter to the editor protesting the injustices alleged to have occurred in Waco.289
communication [derived] precisely from the fact that it was illegal.").
285 See, e.g., Charles R. DiSalvo, Abortion and Consensus: The Futility of Speech, the
Power of Disobedience, 48 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 219, 226 (1991) ("Civil disobedience can
move people when argumentation and exhortation fail."); see also University of Utah
Students Against Apartheid v. Peterson, 649 F. Supp. 1200, 1205 n.9 (D. Utah 1986)
("While the mass media often pays little attention to unorthodox or unpopular ideas, dramatic
displays of action capture media attention when words alone will not."); Vincent Blasi, The
Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 521, 640 ("[The]
kind of stimulus necessary to activate the political conscience of [the] populace sometimes can
be created only by transcending rationality and appealing to more primitive, more basis
instincts [through symbolic conduct]."); Ball, supra note 267, at 40A (quoting a retired truck
driver who planned to participate in civilly disobedient acts at an upcoming school board
meeting to protest its racism, "[i]f we don't protest, our voices will not be heard").
286 See Williams, supra note 75, at 706.
Where the regulation impacts on an expressive aspect of speech, there are no adequate
alternatives. It is true that verbal and written means of expression are left open when
symbolic speech is foreclosed. But saying "I hate and resist the Vietnam War" was no
more an adequate alternative for O'Brien than if Thomas Jefferson had been forced to
write that "The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of
patriots and very bad rulers."
Id.
2 87 That normally respected, law-abiding citizens feel strongly enough about an issue to
break the law and subject themselves to punishment is often an important part of the message.
See, e.g., Inside Politics (Cable News Network, July 20, 1995) (describing arrests for civil
disobedience protesting university admissions policy as "planned in advance, and announced
in advance and [involving] six prominent local people").
288 See, e.g., Barbara Reynolds, Lessons of Dignity from 40 Years Ago, Dns MoInms
REGISTER, Dec. 4, 1995, available in 1995 WL 7222778 (describing Rosa Park's protest as
arising not from "hurt feet" but dignity).
289 The sole purpose of this example is to make a point about the message conveyed by
illegal conduct. It is not at all clear that the Oklahoma City bombing would qualify as
expressive conduct. Neither an intent to communicate nor a message reasonably
understandable to an audience are certain. Moreover, the act certainly would not qualify as
socially valuable civil disobedience because of its personally-directed violence and the fact
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In both instances, the illegal action contributes something profoundly different
to the public dialogue than would the legal means of communication.
Of course, that the mode of communication is lawbreaking injects other
types of noncommunicative harms into the balance. In the case of the Oklahoma
City bombing, which claimed 168 lives and resulted in countless physical and
emotional injuries, those harms unquestionably justify the government in
absolutely prohibiting anyone, ever, to choose bombing as a means of
communicating his or her minority opposition to the actions of the majority-
established political order. The fact remains, however, that no other means
communicates the same message as breaking the law. Excising it from the
political dialogue has constitutionally significant consequences. In many other
instances, the Court has recognized the distinct communicative impact of even
"distasteful mode[s] of expression. 290 The same should be true even when the
means involved breaking the law.
3. The Likely Lesser Value of the Government's Interest as Applied to
Civil Disobedience
The analytically sound justification for penalty enhancement is that the
characteristic that triggers the enhancement, when combined with the base
conduct, creates harms "special" and greater than the conduct alone.291 Where
the base conduct is political protest, this conclusion is doubtful. Specific types
of enhancements may isolate victim-targeting action, 292 concerted or repeated
action, 293 or purposeful action more generally,294 but where purposefully
choosing the victim is for a publicly communicative purpose, it may not result
that the perpetrator did not willingly accept the punishment for the illegal action.
290 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (reversing a disturbing the peace
conviction of draft protester who wore a jacket into the Los Angeles County Courthouse
emblazoned with "Fuck the Draft").
291 See discussion supra Part IIL.C (detailing the proper place of penalty enhancements
in the clarified free speech model).
292 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 939.645 (1989-1990) (cited in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508
U.S. 476, 480 (1993) (enhancing the penalty for a defendant who "[intentionally selects" the
victim according to certain characteristics)); Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18
U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) & (c) (1994) (enhancing penalty for a defendant who "intentionally
injures, intimidates or interferes" with a person "because that person has been... obtaining
or providing reproductive health services").
293 See, e.g., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)
(1994) (enhancing penalty for participating "in the conduct of [an] enterprise's affairs through
a pattern of racketeering activity").
294 For example, punitive damanges are awarded when the defendant is guilty of "a bad
state of mind." DOBBS, supra note 102, § 3.11(2), at 468.
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in the individual or social harms that prompted the enhancement. 295 Concerted
or repeated action, when the association or repetition is a tool of public
dialogue, may correlate to more effective political expression296 rather than a
coercive criminal monopoly. 297  In addition, whereas purposefulness in
lawbreaking usually correlates with greater social evil, such a correlation is less
certain with the civil disobedient who purposefully breaks the law to produce
dialogue-a social value, along with the noncommunicative harms that
incidentally accompany the conduct. All of these considerations mean that, in
many particular instances where a penalty enhancement may be applied to
civilly disobedient conduct, the triggering characteristic may not effectively
segregate more individually and socially harmful behavior from the broader
class of conduct that produces the same functional harms.
4. Disproportionate Viewpoint Impact on Political Dissenters
The breadth of a penalty enhancement provision may demonstrate that the
government did not intend to target political dissenters, but a proper
constitutional balance looks to disproportionate viewpoint impact even absent a
government purpose to suppress dissent. And penalty enhancement provisions,
to the extent that they sweep civilly disobedient conduct within their scopes,
surely have such an impact.
In fact, penalty enhancement provisions, as applied to the segregable class
of expressive conduct, have the same effect as would a provision that enhanced
the punishment for any crime if it was committed "for the purpose of political
295 The greater individual and social harms that prompt enhancements stem from the fact
that the illegal action is individually directed. Specifically, with hate crime enhancements, the
additional harms include a greater likelihood of retaliation and greater fear and unrest. These
harms seem less likely to occur when an individual like the one in the hypothetical, though
chosen for his characteristics, is intended as a public model. The public-directed nature of the
conduct would likely diffuse the individually retaliatory impulse as well as be less likely to
raise fears of widespread duplication of the conduct against other private individuals. FACE
requires slightly different analysis because it was directed against political protest. However,
not all protests result in the same individual and social harms. The two-time church meeting
protesters of the example would appear to cause individual and social harms of quite a
different magnitude and nature than persistent, repeated, often personally violent anti-abortion
protesters whose activities prompted FACE's enactment.
296 See, e.g., NAACP v. Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907 (1982) ("'Mhe
practice of persons sharing common views banding together to achieve a common end is
deeply embedded in the American political process.'" (quoting Citizens Against Rent Control
Coalition for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981))).
297 See id. at 910 ("Speech does not lose its protected character... simply because it
may embarrass others or coerce them into action.").
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protest." Specifically, penalty enhancements, as opposed to base penalties, act
only upon conduct already illegal for reasons other than those that trigger the
additional punishment. Because penalty enhancements apply only to
lawbreakers, their application will have a disproportionate silencing effect on
political dissenters, as opposed to those who agree with majority rulemaking, as
the latter would be unlikely to break the law in order to praise it.
The explicitly discriminatory rule penalizing political protesters would
require strict scrutiny under either the current or clarified free speech model. 298
The discriminatory impact of the broader enhancements, however, even
without an explicit governmental intent to do so, distorts the marketplace of
ideas in a constitutionally significant way.2 99 It is most crucial to guard
dissenting points of view from unconscious as well as purposeful silencing
because the minority viewpoints are the most likely to be ignored in the
majority decisionmaking process.300 Across the board, in any particular
instance when considering the adoption of a penalty enhancement provision,
lawmakers are likely to be insensitive, or perhaps even hostile, to the interests
of whatever small minority may want to communicate their dissent through the
means of breaking the law. Penalizing lawbreakers more heavily through
penalty enhancement provisions that effectively correlate to their protest
purpose disproportionately silences one side of the political debate about the
validity of majority rulemaking. As with speech restrictions, this viewpoint
impact of a conduct restriction is an important consideration in the constitutional
balance.
298 The rule falls in the nebulous middle ground between content- and viewpoint-
discrimination. In one sense, the anti-political protest rule deals neutrally with all topics of
protest. In another sense, it discriminates against an anti-government viewpoint because
people holding that point of view are the ones likely to use the means of lawbreaking to
register their protest. No matter which characterization is used, however, the rule
undoubtedly targets expression and thus would be analyzed as a speech restriction, which
would receive strict scrutiny whether the government's action was based upon content or
viewpoint.
299 See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68
CALIF. L. REv. 422, 472 (1980); William E. Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little People, and
the Supreme Court: The Doctrine of TIme, Place, and Manner Regulations of Expression, 54
GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 757, 764-71 (1986); Redish, supra note 213, at 130 ("That the
expression is regulated for reasons other than its content makes it no less an interference with
expression.").
300 See, e.g., Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. Rnv. 317, 349 (1987) (arguing, in the context of racism,
that "unconscious prejudice presents [a problem] in that it is not subject to self-correction
within the political process").
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B. Striking the Penalty Enhancement Balance in Particular Situations
Under the Clarified Free Speech Clause Model
Penalty enhancements on top of civilly disobedient lawbreaking
presumptively violate the free speech clause both because their trigger is the
socially valuable protest purpose and because that purpose, when combined
with the base conduct, does not usually result in more harmful consequences
than the base conduct alone. Still, the government may justify its enhancement
in particular applications, either by showing that the conduct combined with the
triggering characteristic does indeed result in special harms beyond those that
result from the base conduct or by demonstrating that its interest in uniform
enforcement outweighs the free expression interests of the few civil disobedients
who may break the law for expressive reasons. The following discussion
reviews the considerations that should enter into the constitutional balance with
respect to the particular types of penalty enhancements that form the basis for
the examples in Part I.
1. Hate Crime Statutes
Hate crime statutes bear that name for a reason: Their purpose is to
penalize conduct motivated by racial hatred because of the individual and social
harm that such motive-based conduct causes. The Mitchell Court acknowledged
as much in referring to the Wisconsin statute as covering "bias-inspired
conduct. '30 1 Some jurisdictions had explicitly referred to crimes evidencing
"prejudice based on race" as the enhancement trigger, 302 but the more recent
trend is to adopt the victim-targeting language upheld in Mitchell.303 The
broader language, which may include a range of viewpoints within its scope,
insulates the statute from attack under the current free speech model.
This broader language also sweeps within its scope the student protesters of
the first example. However, a more complex balance must occur for the student
protesters than for the defendant in Mitchell. Most importantly, the trespass,
although illegal as an invasion of property rights, is political expression. The
students intend to convey a message that is likely to be understood. That the
trespass is expressive does not prohibit imposition of punishment for the
noncommunicative harms caused by the broad class of conduct. Consistent with
301 Wisconsin V. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993).
302 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 775.085 (1985); H.R. 4797, 102d Cong. § 2(b) (1992)
(proposed federal statute passed by House, but not the Senate, referring to conduct "motivated
by hatred, bias or prejudice, based on [certain protected characteristics]").
303 See, e.g., H.R. 1152, 103d Cong. (1993) (newer House bill tracking the Wisconsin
statute's language).
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a crucial prerequisite for civil disobedience, the students willingly accept that
punishment, but upon accepting the punishment, as well as conforming with the
other civil disobedience requirements, their conduct becomes different in a
constitutionally significant way from a purely functional trespass. The latter
results only in harms that are within the government's broad discretion to
evaluate and punish. The former has expressive value, which triggers free
speech clause analysis when a further penalty is imposed upon it.
The most deferential inquiry when the government imposes a penalty
enhancement is whether the government might reasonably believe that the
conduct plus the characteristic triggering the enhancement result in greater
harm than the base conduct alone. With respect to the trespass at issue, the
question is whether the students' choosing the "owner of property" because of
race might likely lead to individual and social harms greater than the base
conduct. The harms articulated by the state in Mitchell were that the base
conduct plus the triggering characteristic led to crimes "more likely to provoke
retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on their victims, and incite
community unrest."304 However, none of these harms seem to hold true in the
instance of the student protest. Rather, the triggering characteristic acts in
reverse, identifying a relatively rare instance where a crime has redeeming
social value. Thus, it is possible that the free speech clause inquiry would
terminate upon the government's failure to articulate any reason for enhancing
the punishment in the particular instance of civil disobedience.
Perhaps, however, the government could articulate some special harms that
flow from basing decisions on race in any manner whatsoever, 305 or the
government might point to the difficulty of distinguishing racist from racial
motivation in particular instances and argue the need for uniform enforcement.
Assuming these interests to be plausible, the multi-factor balancing inquiry must
occur. In this inquiry, the weight, in addition to the existence, of a government
interest must be determined. Applied to the example where race-targeting is
used for the purpose of promoting racial tolerance, neither of the above
interests appear substantial.
Weighing against the government interest is the students' interest in their
chosen means of communication. Is there an alternate, similarly effective means
for the students to convey their message? No. Lawbreaking is part of the
304 Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 488.
305 This might be something along the lines of enforcing "colorblindness" even as to the
commission of crimes. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641-42 (1993) (recognizing a
modified "constitutional right to participate in a 'color blind' electoral process" under which
the government may not separate voters into different districts on the basis of race without
compelling justification); see also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (same); Shaw v. Hunt,
517 U.S. 899 (1996) (same); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (same).
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message. Student sit-ins enjoy a rich history that contributes to the message of
any particular conduct,306 and the illegal conduct will likely publicize their
protest in a way they could not lawfully achieve. Applying the enhancement to
political protesters will have a disproportionate impact on those with an anti-
government point of view.307 Thus, all of these factors dictate that the free
speech clause forbids application of the victim-targeting penalty enhancement to
the hypothetical student protest.
Beyond this particular hypothetical application to civil disobedience, which,
after all, will be the exception rather than the norm, the demonstrated breadth
of the penalty enhancement upheld in Mitchell teaches another lesson. Where
the special harms that justify a penalty enhancement correspond to a particular
viewpoint, breadth is a dubious, and even perverse, guarantee of the
provision's constitutionality in its entire range of applications. Specifically, the
Wisconsin statute's victim-targeting trigger includes racial, along with racist,
motivation. Thus a defendant who victimized recent immigrants of a particular
nationality because of a belief that they would be less likely to report the crimes
would qualify for the enhancement. 308 Unlike the student protesters, the
enhancement trigger does not correlate to a socially valuable purpose. The base
act is a functional crime that warrants no free speech clause protection absent a
government purpose to suppress a particular point of view. Under the
deferential rational basis standard that would apply to such a decision, including
the racially motivated criminal with the racist would likely survive constitutional
review.
But is this the right result from a perspective concerned with sound
government decisionmaking? That is, should the constitutional incentive be to
broaden the class to which a penalty enhancement may apply beyond the
particular concern that prompted its enactment? The better rule is that the scope
of a penalty enhancement should be defined as precisely as possible to mirror
the special harms, beyond those that result from the base crime, that justify the
greater punishment. If those harms correlate to the perpetrator's viewpoint on a
political topic, then the constitutional analysis should explicitly recognize the
306 See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (recognizing expressive value of sit-
in); Ledewitz, supra note 6, at 501 ("The sit-in has been a familiar aspect of political protest
since the 1950s.").
307 See supra note 225. The line between content- and viewpoint-impact is murky. The
class of anti-government protesters may be seen to represent a distinct viewpoint as against
those who support the established order. Yet within the class of anti-government protesters
may be those who evidence racial hatred as well as racial tolerance. Because a focus of the
free speech clause is to protect dissenters against government repression, the anti-government
impact should weigh against the validity of the government action.
308 See Weinstein, supra note 112, at 364 (positing this hypothetical).
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expressive impact of the ostensibly conduct-directed government action. The
question should be whether the special harms justify the viewpoint focus. That
there are concrete, noncommunicative harms that result from the conduct plus
viewpoint-motivation that do not apply if the enhancement is broadened to
include other viewpoints on the same topic should weigh in favor of the
enhancement's validity. Where those do not plausibly exist, the enhancement
must be invalidated as a naked effort to suppress a disfavored point of view.
Such a precisely tailored enhancement might even distinguish between
particular instances of political protest, validly applying to some because,
despite the expressive value, the special harms that justify the enhancement
exist as well. Consider the difference between the student protesters and the
white supremacist who, cloaked in Ku Klux Klan garb, carries a burning cross
onto an African American family's lawn, sits, and respectfully waits to be
arrested. Both acts are civil disobedience, but the racist motivation of the latter
must impact the constitutional analysis because it results in additional individual
and social harms beyond the base trespassing conduct.
Some may be uncomfortable with a distinction between the two acts of
political protest. Indeed, it smacks of governmental viewpoint discrimination
which is supposed to be the greatest constitutional evil. To alleviate this
impression, it is crucial to recall that forbidden governmental viewpoint
discrimination targets expression, not the additional nonexpressive
consequences of motive-based conduct. The latter, if they truly exist, may
justify a penalty that disproportionately impacts those who hold a particular
political point of view. In both the student protester and the Ku Klux Klan
examples, the government was presumed to be able to articulate nonexpressive
"special harms" that justified the enhancement, thereby invoking the content-
neutral balancing test rather than strict scrutiny review. Pursuant to this
balancing test, the student protesters would likely prevail whereas the
government interest in eliminating the harmful consequences of the cross-
burning would likely outweigh the social benefit of the expression.
In either case, it is the particularized balance that must determine the
outcome, rather than broad generalizations. Cloaking the enhancement
provision with a generalized description that includes instances where bias is
not the motive provides a false guarantee of fairness. The government more
harshly penalizes criminals who may not deserve the punishment so as to
appear viewpoint neutral. Free speech clause analysis should not encourage this
ploy. Rather, the analysis should promote careful tailoring. This means that
sometimes enhancements specifically stated in terms of viewpoint will be
constitutionally superior to broader enhancements because they more precisely
address the government's legitimate, nonspeech-based interest.
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2. Federalizing Enhancements
a. FACE
The lower courts that have examined FACE have found it constitutionally
valid because it is directed at unprotected activity 309 and because it does not
discriminate on the basis of political viewpoint.310 As applied to acts of civil
disobedience, both of these conclusions are questionable. First, accepting the
base punishment for illegal conduct transforms civilly disobedient lawbreaking
into socially valuable expression.311 It is unprotected from imposition of the
base penalty, but is protected from imposition of an enhancement absent a
balance in which the harms flowing from the conduct because of its protest
motivation outweigh its expressive value. 312 Second, even absent a government
intent to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, such a viewpoint discriminatory
impact is the result of FACE's application. It is pro-life activists who prompted
FACE's enactment, and it is to pro-life activists that FACE primarily
applies.313 Thus, neither of these observations provide the final conclusion as to
whether FACE may be applied to instances of civil disobedience. Rather, a
multi-factor balance must determine if the harms of the conduct outweigh its
value and thereby justify the penalty enhancement.
It is first necessary to clarify exactly which type of abortion protest
activities may qualify as civil disobedience. These are activities where
participants openly break the law and accept the punishment in order to send a
public message. Many of the abortion protest activities, specifically those cited
in favor of the statute's enactment, do not meet this definition, either because
the acts involve personally directed violence314 or are covert,315 because they
309 See, e.g., American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 648 (4th Cir. 1995)
(stating that FACE "target[s] unprotected activity").
310 See, e.g., United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 923 (8th Cir. 1996) ("FACE's
motive requirement does not discriminate against speech or conduct that expresses an
abortion-related message.").
311 See discussion supra Part III.B.
312 See supra Part M.A.2 and Diagrams D and G (clarifying the free speech model so
that government actions impacting expressive conduct must undergo the same multi-factor
balancing test that applies to content-neutral speech restrictions).
313 See, e.g., Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 923 (noting, and seeming to accept, defendant's
factual assertion that "the vast majority of people whose conduct [FACE] proscribes are
opposed to abortion").
314 See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 11, at 366 ("To engage in violent acts likely to injure
and to hurt is incompatible with civil disobedience as a mode of address.").
315 See supra note 238 and accompanying text (noting that civil disobedience must be
public and open in order to constitute socially valuable expression).
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are not engaged in for the purpose of expression, 316 or because the expression
is not publicly directed.317 The question remains, however, whether FACE
may validly apply to those protest activities that meet the definition of civil
disobedience.
As public expression on a political issue, abortion protest contributes to
public dialogue. Because lawbreaking is a unique means of expression and the
site of protest adds symbolic significance to the expression, enhancing the
penalty for such protest actions will detrimentally affect the richness of public
debate. Moreover, as noted above, enforcement of FACE's penalty
enhancements will disproportionately affect not only the class of persons
opposed to government policy in general, but those opposed to abortion in
particular. These factors create the presumption that civilly disobedient abortion
protests outside abortion clinics should be protected from penalty enhancement.
However, the legislative history 318 and judicial opinions319 contain
extensive documentation of the harms caused by abortion protests. Although
many of these harms will not result from activity that qualifies as civil
disobedience, some will. The issue is whether these harms are great enough to
outweigh the factors in the constitutional balance that presumptively protect
civil disobedience from penalty enhancement. Viewed on a case-by-case basis,
316 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 93-117, at 11 (1993) ("The express purpose of the violent and
threatening activity described [in this report] is to deny women access to safe and legal
abortion services. Anti-abortion activists have made it plain that this conduct is part of a
deliberate campaign to eliminate access by closing clinics and intimidating doctors.").
317 Much of the protest outside abortion clinics is directed toward the individuals seeking
abortions and those providing them, rather than toward the general public. See Madsen v.
Women's Health Cir., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 769 (1994) (distinguishing between "focused
picketing" and "generally disseminated communication"); Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412,
1414 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (referring to the "'sidewalk counseling'" offered by protesters to
women entering abortion facilities (quoting Plaintiff s complaint)).
318 See S. REP. No. 93-117, at 15 (1993).
319 A New York district court has stated that:
Mhe risks associated with an abortion increase if the patient suffers from additional
stress and anxiety [caused by abortion protest activities]. Increased stress and
anxiety can cause patients to: (1) have elevated blood pressure; (2) hyperventilate;
(3) require sedation; or (4) require special counseling and attention before they are
able to obtain heath care. Patients may become so agitated that they are unable to lie
still in the operating room thereby increasing the risks associated with surgery.
Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1427 (W.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd
sub. nom. Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 1994), vacated in part on
reh'g en banc, 67 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, and remanded 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997).
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and especially with respect to purely peaceful obstruction, these harms probably
do not rise to this level. On a one-time basis, peaceful obstruction carries the
harms of a simple trespass: It creates annoyance, inconvenience, and a
temporary interference with private rights, but not much more than that.
Yet the history of protests that led to the enactment of FACE is something
quite different than one-time peaceful protest. It is sustained, persistent, often
individually directed, and sometimes life-threatening activity. 320 The individual
and social harms that flow from this series of activities are importantly different
from sporadic protests. Repetition weakens the resistance of the individual
targets, thereby magnifying the harm of any particular action. The background
activities form a fear-inspiring context against which any particular activity is
perceived. Part of this context is that initially peaceful activities may devolve
into threats or violence. This background may legitimately augment the
government's interest in uniformly enhancing the penalty for engaging in
certain activities that may, in some instances, be socially valuable civil
disobedience that does not result in the harms that justified the enhancement's
enactment. For all of these reasons, FACE may legitimately apply to the
abortion protesters of the example.
This same conclusion is much more dubious with respect to those protesters
who, like the Catholic women in the example, disrupt the exercise of First
Amendment rights in places of worship. 321 That this provision was added to a
statute titled in terms of "clinics" has been cited as evidence of its viewpoint
neutrality. 322 In addition, because this provision does not stem from the same
type of history of persistent, continuing protest, 323 it may not have the same
320 See, e.g., Terry, 101 F.3d at 1414 ("Reacting to a nationwide pattern of blockades,
vandalism, and violence aimed at abortion clinics and their patients and employees, Congress
enacted [FACE].").
321 See 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(2) (1994).
322 See, e.g., Michael S. Paulsen & Michael W. McConnell, The DoubOid
Constitutionality of the Clinic Access Bill, 1 VA. J. Soc. PoL'Y & L. 261, 287 (1994) (noting
that the additional provision helps, but does not entirely alleviate, their concern that FACE is
viewpoint discriminatory).
32 3 The "place of worship" provision was added in response to ACT-UP's disruption of
mass outside St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York, at which 4500 protesters rallied and 111
people were arrested, including 43 inside the cathedral. See Jason De Parle, 111 Held in St.
Patrick's AIDS Protest, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 11, 1989, at B3. Although ACT-UP has
conducted a number of church protests, see Anne Howen, ACT UP: Radical Soldiers in the
War on AIDS, WASH. Tms, Nov. 12, 1991, at El, its gay rights and AIDS awareness goals
cause it to target a much broader range of protest cites than places of worship, see Levy,
supra note 2, at Al (listing history of "audacious media events" staged by ACT-UP, "such as
infiltrating the floor of the New York Stock Exchange, staging a mass 'die-in' in front of the
White House and blocking traffic on the Golden Gate Bridge").
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viewpoint discriminatory impact as do the clinic-related provisions. 324 Still, it
can, like the clinic-related provisions, enhance the punishment for socially
valuable civil disobedience, which is a unique means of communication.
Therefore, a government interest in addressing harms beyond those caused by
the base act of lawbreaking must exist to justify the free speech impact of the
enhancement.
However, looking to the example of the church meeting disruption, the
additional harms do not appear to be present. The protesters were disorderly
and thereby interfered with the group's right to hold its meeting uninterrupted,
but the protesters were rounded up reasonably quickly, arrested, and removed.
Thus the group members could exercise their First Amendment rights without a
health-endangering or psychologically traumatizing delay. 325 None of the group
members experienced, or were in reasonable fear of, bodily harm due to the
protest. In sum, none of the special harms that prompted enactment of FACE
appear to have been present.
Moreover, the absence of a sustained history of frequently threatening and
violent protest with respect to the exercise of First Amendment rights lessens
the government interest in uniformly applying the penalty enhancement to
individual actions that do not meet the profile of those that prompted the
enhancement. 326 The relatively few church disruptions by gay activist groups is
a slender reed upon which to hang a penalty enhancement provision directed at
political protest even as applied to acts similar in nature.327 However, those
protests certainly do not flavor the perception of other protests that may occur
on the premises of houses of worship. There has not been the magnitude of
324 That is, protesters may interfere with First Amendment rights at a place of worship
for the purpose of publicizing many other viewpoints than gay rights.
325 Compare these effects with Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp.
1417, 1427 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (listing the health risks to women whose access to abortion
services is impeded by protest activities) and S. REP. No. 93-117, at 15 (1993) (noting the
"traumatic effects" of abortion protests on women seeking abortions).
326 Unquestionably, the St. Patrick's Cathedral protest, which prompted the
enhancement, was both threatening and violent. See John Leo, Wen Activism Becomes
Gangsterism, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 5, 1990, at 18 (describing the Sunday
mass invasion that included screaming, tossing condoms, spitting holy wafers, and protesters
chaining themselves to pews).
327 In the instance of gay church protests, there is not the alternate functional
purpose of the clinic protests of stopping the act of abortion from occurring even
without delivering a political message. The purpose of the trespass is solely to express a
political point of view. See Levy, supra note 2, at Al (describing numerous ACT-UP
events, all of which had functional consequences, such as disrupting government
services, traffic, or the activities of the stock exchange, but none of which were
plausibly directed at the functional goal absent the symbolic significance).
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repetition that would weaken the resistance of the individual targets to any
particular action. The background activities are not part of an organized effort
that would form a fear-inspiring context against which any particular activity is
perceived. 328 Nor is there a history of initially peaceful activities devolving into
threats or violence.
In sum, the justifications for uniform enforcement of the clinic access
provisions do not exist with the provisions respecting places of worship. The
latter provisions were add-ons, without the extensive documentation of
pervasive special harms that can justify applying a penalty enhancement to
suppress socially valuable expression. Because the government interest in
uniform enforcement of the abortion-related provisions of FACE does not exist
with the religion-related provisions, each application of these provisions to
expressive conduct, and to civil disobedience in particular, must be separately
evaluated to determine whether the balance of factors justifies the enhancement.
b. RICO
The Court has noted the dual aspects of concerted action: While it poses
"special dangers... associated with conspiratorial activity," it is a
"foundation[] of our society" as a tool for effecting social change. 329
Particularly in the context of RICO, several Justices have cautioned courts
applying its provisions "to bear in mind the First Amendment interests that
could be at stake" when the defendant's activities constitute political protest.330
Pointedly missing from the various judicial caveats, however, is a recognition
that deliberate lawbreaking-particularly acts of civil disobedience-could be
protected from the RICO penalty enhancement. 331
Instead, the Court's impliedly exact correlation of unlawful with
constitutionally unprotected activity condones the lower courts' conclusions that
misdemeanors such as trespass or harassment may transform protected protest
activities into racketeering subject to the penalty enhancements of RICO. For
the lower courts, the automatic equation is between illegal acts and "wrongful
328 The reason that previous protests influence the perception of later ones is that they
seem to form a united effort. Protests at places of worship by different individuals or groups
pursuing different ideological agendas are not reasonably viewed in this way.
329 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 933-34 (1982).
330 National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 265 (1994).
3 3 1 See id. at 264 (expressing concern that "fully protected First Amendment activity"
might result in RICO liability); Claibone Hardware, 458 U.S. at 934 (referring to valuable
concerted action as "combin[ing] with other persons in pursuit of a common goal by lawful
means").
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acts" that constitute Hobbs Act extortion. 332 However, where free expression,
particularly political protest, is at stake, "precision of regulation" is required. 333
Speech may be protected even though it is coercive. 334 Under the clarified free
speech clause model, the same conclusion should apply to expression through
conduct, specifically to civilly disobedient lawbreaking. That is, the point of
civil disobedience is to cause the majority to change the policies that it
embodies in law. This expressive purpose has social value. The means of
expression is breaking the law. Where the protester otherwise meets the
requirements for socially valuable civil disobedience, the mere fact of
lawbreaking should not transform valuable expression into "wrongful"
extortion. Rather, where the protester accepts the base penalty, the respectful,
publicly expressive nature of the lawbreaking should counsel against
enhancement.
In most instances where the lawbreaking constitutes civil disobedience, the
balance of other factors will protect it from constituting a predicate act under
RICO. As noted in the other applications, civil disobedience is socially valuable
expression conveyed through a unique means. Although the government
certainly did not target anti-government protesters when it enacted RICO,
application of the racketeering provisions against protesters will
disproportionately impact those who disagree with government policies. These
factors weigh in favor of protecting expressive lawbreaking from the RICO
enhancement.
On the other side of the balance is the government's interest in punishing
concerted action, which is a "powerful weapon" 335 that may increase the
individual and social harms of any particular action. But when concerted action
is for the purpose of delivering a public message, these additional harms might
not exist. Specifically, RICO was aimed at the dangers posed by an organized,
underground criminal network that credibly threatened violence as a means of
obtaining property for the individual benefit of the criminal actors. In the few
instances where protesters engage in or credibly threaten personally directed
violence through their political expression so that their targets reasonably "fear"
for their safety, the government interest in punishing the additional harms that
come from concerted action may justify a penalty enhancement. Yet the Hobbs
Act's "force" threshold is much lower than violence, and its alternative "fear"
332 See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1994) (defining extortion as the obtaining of "property"
from another, with his consent, induced by "wrongful use of actual or threatened force,
violence or fear").
333 Caiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 916 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
438 (1963)).
334 See id. at 910.
335 See id. at 932.
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requirement, which includes fear of business loss or the loss of an intangible
right to obtain business services, is much different than a personal safety fear.
Both concepts are broad enough that, in application to protest activities, they
may fail to identify those that result in significantly greater harms that outweigh
the expression's social value when patterned.
The examples indicate two potential applications of RICO to political
protest activities. Both involve publicly directed expression on a political topic.
Under the clarified free speech clause model, each requires a particularized
balance to determine whether the RICO enhancement may constitutionally
restrict the expression.
Because the same examples may qualify the protesters for FACE or RICO
liability, the particularized multi-factor balance is the same for RICO as for
FACE. Specifically, the government interest in restricting the one action of
either example is not strong enough to justify the enhancement. But the
different history and contexts of abortion clinic protests as opposed to place of
worship protests may affect the analysis of any particular application. That is,
sustained, continuing, often personally directed and/or violent history of
abortion protests may affect the evaluation of whether the access-blocking
prayer vigil "wrongfully" causes "fear" so as to result in "extortion." This
history also adds significance to RICO's "pattern" trigger, vividly
demonstrating the additional individual and social harms that planned,
concerted action may pose as compared to sporadic, individual action. As with
the application of FACE, this history may justify applying RICO's provisions to
the protesters of the example even though their acts might not produce harms
enough to justify the enhancement outside this context.
Also, as with the application of FACE, application of RICO to the church
protesters is more questionable. No sustained history of obviously "wrongful"
conduct forms a background for evaluating the two acts that form the RICO
pattern. Rather, they stand alone, cloaked with the values that attend civil
disobedience, against the dubious government interest in restricting organized
action undertaken for the purpose of public expression. In this balance, the
expression should prevail-meaning that protesters may be punished for the
nonspeech-related harms that their ordinary trespass causes, but not for the
nonexistent additional nonspeech-related harms that flow from their patterned
action.
The result in any other case of political protest activities must depend upon
a fact-specific balance. Yet crucial to the balance in any particular RICO
application is the recognition that civil disobedience has expressive value in the
clarified free speech clause model. The line between lawful actions and those
illegal for reasons independent of expression may dictate the result on a per se
basis when the issue is application of a base penalty. It is too severe, however,
1998]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
when the subject is penalty enhancement. Although ostensibly directed at
conduct, RICO sweeps within its broad scope two characteristics of First
Amendment value-expression and association. When the two are combined,
the resulting conduct must be presumptively protected from enhanced
punishment, subject to a government showing that the patterned action results in
additional harms that outweigh the social value of the expression.
3. Punitive Damages
In one sense, imposition of punitive damages for civilly disobedient actions
presents the same issue as other penalty enhancements: Whether the
characteristics that trigger their imposition isolate actions that result in greater
harms than the base functional conduct. In another sense, however, punitive
damages present a different issue. The constitutional problem with the more
specific statutory enhancements is that their defining characteristics might apply
to socially valuable expression. But the standard for imposing punitive damages
specifically limits their range to "wanton misconduct," that amounts to "a
particularly aggravated, deliberate disregard of the rights of others." 336 Because
the definition seems to precisely isolate actions grossly more harmful than other
functional acts within the class, it seems to solve the constitutional problem.
Although expression- and viewpoint-neutral on its face, the different
problem that the broad punitive damages standard poses in application is that
political protesters may be punished for their expressive purpose and perhaps
for their particular, unpopular points of view. 337 Neither of these reasons
constitute additional harms that justify the punitive damages penalty
enhancement.
Because civil disobedience is expression under the clarified free speech
clause model, a multi-factor balance must determine whether a punitive
damages award is appropriate in any particular instance. For the reasons noted
above-that it is public expression, conveyed through an unduplicable means,
336 Huffan & Wright Logging Co. v. Wade, 857 P.2d 101, 118 (Or. 1993) (Unis, J.,
dissenting) (quoting UNIFORM CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 35.01).
337 See id. In his dissent, Judge Unis stated:
Put in stark terms, a punitive damages standard that explicitly gives the jury discretion to
award punitive damages for a tort that is committed in conjunction with or accompanied
by or intertwined with a significant communicative component only if the jury
determines that it is in society's best interest to punish and deter the defendant's
particular political message accompanying the conduct would impermissibly punish and
seek to deter speech.
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and penalizing it will disproportionately affect anti-government protest-civil
disobedience is presumptively protected from the punitive damages
enhancement. In any particular case, jury instructions must focus on
nonexpressive harms and judicial review must balance those harms against the
lawbreaking's expressive value. In most instances that involve no personally
directed threats or violence, the judicial balance should remove the question
from the jury. Where the protest actions are personally directed or, although
not personally directed, are persistent so as to weaken targets' resistance, or are
mixed with personally directed actions so that the latter taint the reality or
perception of the former, a jury question may be presented. Specific questions
could focus the jury's inquiry on the types of special harms that may justify the
punitive damages enhancement. Answers to these queries then could aid judicial
review.
With respect to the example of the environmental protesters, imposition of
punitive damages presumptively violates the free speech clause guarantee. As a
prerequisite to sending the issue to the jury, the plaintiff must articulate
additional nonspeech-related harms that flow from the particular characteristics
of the conduct that justify the enhancement.
In the case of a one-time protest, these special harms would not appear to
be present. However, environmental protests of the type detailed in the example
are not one-time events, but are part of an ongoing movement. They occur with
regularity. Camps exist to train environmental protesters in "direct action"
tactics. Celebrities are enlisted to participate in the protests to add to their media
value. 338 For the reasons noted in the context of abortion protests, this history
may affect evaluation of individual events. If the same targets are repeatedly
chosen for protests, the government may have a greater interest in protecting
against this added harm. If the past protests have been violent or personally
threatening, this history may affect the perception of an individual instance. It is
not clear that these reasons, which may constitute additional harms in the
context of abortion protests, exist in the context of environmental protests.
Because the protests are media events rather than functional actions realistically
calculated to protect the environment, repeated targeting of the same entity is
less likely. Moreover, the protests are targeted at property rather than
individuals, and therefore do not impact individual health or safety in the same
way as abortion protests.
None of these considerations dictates a conclusion, but all are relevant to
the constitutional balance. The crux of the inquiry with respect to imposing
punitive damages on top of compensatory damages liability for protest activities
must be whether nonspeech-related characteristics of the act that fall within the
338 See, e.g., Martinez, supra note 2, at B1 (detailing activities of Malibu Action Camp,
a four day training in the techniques of civil disobedience).
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punitive damages instructions cause the act to result in greater harms than other
acts of the same type that lack that characteristic. The answer in most cases of
civil disobedience must be "No."
V. CONCLUSION
Civil disobedience is socially valuable expression. When, through any
variety of means, the government seeks to enhance the punishment for civil
disobedience beyond that applicable to the broader class of actions that cause
the same functional harms the free speech clause enters the picture. The first
question must be whether the characteristics that trigger the enhancement, when
combined with the base conduct, result in additional harms that may justify the
enhancement. If so, then under the clarified free speech clause model, a multi-
factor balance must determine whether the government's interest outweighs the
act's expressive value. Results will differ. But this consequence deserves
applause rather than lamentation. The current free speech clause model contains
the assumption that lawbreaking is once and forever into the future
"unprotected." The clarified free speech clause model distinguishes between
civil disobedience and lawbreaking that lacks an expressive purpose.
Presumptively protecting the former from penalty enhancement more fully
realizes the free speech guarantee.
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